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ABSTRACT  
ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS 
  
by  
  
Chitralekha Rath 
  
  
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014  
Under the Supervision of Professor Niloy Bose 
  
   
  
  There is a consensus among economists and political scientists that institutions 
are crucial for economic development.  Different attributes of institutions like rule of law, 
property rights, legal environment, and constraints on executive have profound effects on 
a nation’s prosperity, growth and development. Recently economists have recognized that 
a system of strong institutions of property rights can enhance efficiency of financial 
sector. A significant part of the dissertation deals with the question that is it likely that 
causality operates the other way:  Does a mature financial market acts as a strong catalyst 
for property rights? 
The first essay develops a theoretical model of financial intermediation with 
incomplete information to augment the notion. The model predicts that the relationship 
does exist and is in fact nonlinear. Thus finance acts as propellant for property rights only 
after crossing a certain threshold. The second essay presents empirical evidence of 
threshold effects in the cross country relationship between property rights and finance 
that are consistent with the theory. Further, in a panel of countries, I show that the 
exogenous component of financial development helps predict property rights in a sample 
of countries where financial markets have crossed a threshold level of development.  
  
iii 
 
The final essay of the dissertation deals with the effects of legal environment on 
financial market. More specifically, it explores the effects of collateral law reforms on 
firms’ perceived access to finance by taking a panel of developing countries. I find 
evidence that collateral law reforms are effective in improving perceived access to credit. 
Moreover the effects are more pronounced when they are accompanied by established 
collateral registries for movable and intangible assets.  Finally these beneficial effects 
seem to increase in the size of the firms.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Dissertation 
 
Since the seminal contribution by Douglas North (1967, 1971), a substantial volume 
of research has been directed toward understanding the importance of institutions in 
shaping economic behaviors. North describes institutions as “the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interactions.” This implies that institutions establish the constraints and determine the 
costs and benefits, under which individuals take their economic decisions. North’s 
influential work was followed by other seminal contributions, such as, Ronald Coase 
(1960), Oliver Willismaosn (1975) and Robert Thomas (1973) who emphasized the 
pivotal roles played by political, legal and economic intuitions.  
While North’s analysis focused on the broad institutional environment of countries 
and the role of state, Coase and Willamson analyzed contracts at firm level and property 
rights which was further expanded by Harold Demsetz (1967).  In their perspective, 
institutions of property rights are crucial since they influence the structure of economic 
incentives in society. A system of well-developed property rights provides incentives for 
adopting better technology and leads to investment in physical and human capital. This 
view has received over whelming support in recent years. Today there is a consensus that 
that property rights encourage investment (Besley 1995; Knack and Keefer 1995; 
Johnson et.al 2002), entrepreneurship (Murphy et. al 1991) , innovation (Stern, Porter, 
and Furman 2000) and are in fact “the fundamental cause of long run growth” (Acemoglu 
et al 2005).  There are a number of channel through which the above relationship could 
transpire. Property rights protection has a direct impact on firm’s investment and 
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financing decisions. A firm is at risk of getting inadequate returns on its investments 
when the government can seize private assets and does not provide fundamental 
protections of property rights. Firms operating in such an environment with insecure 
property rights are uncertain about their ability to keep the fruits of their efforts and as a 
consequence, decrease their investment activities. 
Along with recognizing the importance of the quality of property rights 
institution, a predominant view in literature seems to suggest that institutions are  
persistent, slow moving and they primarily evolve from initial conditions of countries. 
The influential views on historical determinants of property rights indicate that factors 
like legal origin, early settler mortality rate or ethnic fractionalization account for much 
of the variation in institutional sectors. Proponents of the first school of thought (La Porta 
1998),  draw sharp distinctions between civil law and common law and suggest that 
under British common law emphasis falls on the rights of individuals to ownership and 
not on the rights of the state. By contrast, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001; 2002) 
suggest mortality rates amongst European colonies to be an exogenous determinant of 
property rights. They provide evidence that countries with higher settler mortality rates 
introduced extractive institutions and did not protect the property rights of individuals. 
Finally, the third view links ethnic composition to the development of property rights. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ruling classes in ethnically diverse countries 
attempt to expropriate resources from other ethnic factions. Thus these economies also 
tend to have weaker institutions.  Collectively, these views suggest that institutions and 
conventions have their origins in deep seated historical and geographical factors. 
Economic institutions such as property rights, labor relations and land tenure often persist 
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over centuries (Bowels and Naidu 2008).  
In this dissertation, I take a departure from this conventional view and ally with 
the idea proposed by North (1971) which suggests that institutions do change as a 
response to technological innovations or due to changes in economic environment.  For 
this dissertation, such proximate change in the economic environment is the change in the 
level of financial development.  This focus on financial market is not arbitrary.  
According to the existing literature, there is a strong link between the quality of property 
rights institution and the depth and efficiency of the financial sectors. The majority of the 
studies assert that the laws which protect property rights and promote enforcement of 
ﬁnancial contracts also foster higher levels of ﬁnancial development (La Porta, Lopez-de 
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2002), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2002, 2005), Claessens and Laeven (2003), Djankov et.al 2007; De Soto, 2001; Besley 
and Ghatak, 2009).   This is true because law that limits expropriation and better protects 
the rights of shareholders and creditors raises the price that securities fetch in the 
marketplace. In turn, this enables more entrepreneurs to finance their investments 
externally, leading to the expansion of financial markets. Property rights can also catalyze 
“collateral benefits”. Extending and improving property rights allow assets to be pledged 
as collateral for loan. In developing countries, plagued with credit crunch and capital 
market imperfections, this greatly improves the functioning and workings of credit 
markets.  
The above literature indicates that the direction of causality runs from property 
rights to financial development. But is it possible that the reverse is also true? In other 
words, could a mature financial market provide incentives to better codify and protect 
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individuals’ rights to ownership? This is the question I explore in the first two chapters of 
my dissertation.  The final chapter of the dissertation follow the conventional view seeks 
to establish an empirical connection between legal reforms and firms’ access to finance.  
The first chapter offers a theoretical model in establishing a link running from of 
financial intermediation to the quality property rights institution.  In this economy 
individuals must access external funds for their investments. However, in the presence of 
information friction, financial intermediaries ration credit and some borrowers are denied 
loans. Faced with this possibility, borrowers post assets as collateral to improve the terms 
and conditions of lending. However these collaterals are subjected to encroachment due 
the lack of property rights. Of course, the property owners can take action against this 
encroachment in various ways, but such actions come at a cost that is increasing with the 
fraction of property the owners wish to safeguard.   
On the other hand, apart from the obvious gains, protecting property positively 
influences the contractual arrangements in the financial sector. Specifically, the more an 
individual spends securing property, the more collateral she can post to better the terms 
and conditions of a loan contract. The first chapter exploits this tradeoff and shows that 
the marginal net gain from posting collateral increases with the level of financial 
development. As a result, more mature financial markets create additional incentives for 
individuals to secure their right to ownership.  
In this chapter I also exploit the above micro foundations to draw conclusions at 
the aggregate level. In doing so, I do not simply aggregate individuals’ behaviors. Instead 
I take into account that an individual’s cost of protecting property is affected by the 
decisions of  other individuals with regard to protecting their own property. This opens 
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the analysis up to a richer set of outcomes at the aggregate level.  In particular, I show 
that aggregate behavior can be characterized by multiple equilibria. Significantly, the 
equilibrium which prevails is uniquely determined by the quality of the financial system. 
The key implication of such analysis is that the number of agents in the economy 
initiating safeguards against encroachment increases monotonically with the development 
of the banking system after it has crossed a certain threshold. Below this threshold, 
improvements in the contracting environment have no effect on the degree to which 
society secures private property.  
 In summary, the existing literature assert higher quality property rights 
institutions promote the enforcement of ﬁnancial contracts and foster higher levels of 
ﬁnancial development. In this chapter I offer a theoretical explanation for the causality to 
run from financial development to the quality of property rights institution.  Further, the 
analysis suggests that the level of financial development must cross a threshold before it 
can trigger an improvement in the institutions of property rights.  
The theory developed in the first chapter offers a straight-forward testable 
implication that the relationship between finance and property rights is nonlinear: 
stronger financial markets can catalyze positive institutional reforms, but only after 
financial markets have crossed into an intermediate range of development. The second 
chapter of the dissertation provides a formal test for the theoretical predictions developed 
in the first chapter of the dissertation. It presents empirical evidence in favor of the 
nonlinear association between finance and rights.  
     Making use of a procedure suggested in Hansen (1996; 2000), the analysis 
tests for a threshold relationship between property rights and finance in a cross-section of 
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more than 100 countries over a 35 year period from 1970 to 2005. Data on property rights 
were obtained from is an index assembled by James Gwartney and Robert Lawson and 
published by the Fraser Institute (with the Cato Institute as its US partner) in their 
Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report. A useful feature of the index is 
that it does not simply reflect laws on the books, but also the overall quality of legal 
institutions. The primary determinant of financial development, obtained from word 
Bank, was the credit supplied by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by 
nominal GDP at market prices. 
 Keeping in line with the prediction, the results point to two distinct regimes:  One 
in which the quality of financial systems is poor, and its effect on property rights is weak, 
and the other where the practice of banking has evolved beyond a certain point, such that 
further improvements in access to credit are positively associated with the quality of 
property rights institutions.  In particular, I find that property rights are essentially 
uncorrelated when private credit ratios are below 32 percent.  Above this threshold, the 
data suggest that the variations in financial development help predict stronger property 
rights.  
As a robustness exercise, I also considered the index of property rights published 
by the Heritage Foundation. Additionally, I varied the measure of financial development. 
In particular, I consider the log of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, as well as the log 
of the ratio of commercial bank assets to total banks assets. The predictions of the 
threshold regression were robust to these variations.  
Evidence of threshold effects and non-linearity does not provide a basis for 
structural inferences. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that financial development 
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is endogenous. Instrumental variables estimation within endogenous threshold models is 
difficult. Estimation methods are available only with certain restrictions (Caner and 
Hansen, 2004). Instead I adopt an alternate route and try to resolve the issue of 
identification within a panel framework using the Arellano-Bover system GMM 
estimator. As a benchmark I begin by estimating this relationship for the full sample of 
countries, using fixed effects as well as the system GMM procedure. The coefficients of 
finance were positive and highly significant. Based on these findings, it is evident that 
financial development is strongly correlated with stronger property rights over time.  
Further I link our panel analysis to the earlier analysis of thresholds, by splitting 
the data into two sub-samples based on the previously generated threshold estimates. 
Thus I estimate two sets of panel regressions; one for the low finance group and one for 
the high finance group. I found that the size of the coefficient of finance in low finance 
group were either insignificant or smaller than the high finance group. These results 
suggest that increases in the volume of credit supplied by the banking sector did not bring 
forth stronger property rights in countries where the quality of finance was generally low. 
However, where financial conditions were moderately strong to begin with, 
improvements in the contracting environment paved the way for stronger property rights.  
Other than providing causality from finance to property rights, the results 
presented in these two chapters also contribute to the literature on potential linkages 
between real and the financial sector of an economy. Over the past decade a substantial 
body of research has attempted to identify channels through which financial markets 
shape growth prospects in countries. There is a general consensus that financial 
development is conducive to growth because it mobilizes savings for investments, creates 
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an opportunity to pool risks, improves the allocative efficiency, and lowers transaction 
costs. In these two chapters I provide both theoretical and empirical evidence in favor of 
an alternate channel through which financial development may foster economic 
performance - namely, by creating incentives for countries to strengthen their institutions 
of property rights.  
The last chapter of the dissertation further analyzes the interplay between legal 
environment and financial market. More specifically it explores the effects of legal 
reforms on firms’ access to fiancé in developing countries. The legal reforms in this 
context refer to reforms in collateral law. These reforms are a result of an ongoing 
initiative by the World Bank. The primary objective of these reforms is to ease the credit 
constraints faced by firms in low and middle income countries.   
The motivation behind these reforms is straight forward. It is well established 
both in theory and empirics that collateral reduces incidences of credit rationing and 
facilitates efficient allocation of resources.  These benefits are particularly large for 
developing countries where firms’ ability to put up collateral is limited (Liberti and Mian, 
2010) and credit markets are plagued with informational frictions (Luoto et al. 2004).  
In practice these reforms take many forms: setting up of collateral registries, 
modernizing existing registries or taking initiatives to unify registries electronically 
across geographical regions. In this chapter, however the focus is on a set of reforms that 
have allowed for a wider set of assets to be used as collateral. 
These assets include movable and intangible assets which prior to the reforms 
were excluded from the list of collaterals. Studying the effect of this reform is 
particularly significant in light of the fact that a recent study conducted in 60 low and 
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middle income countries discovered that private firms in these countries own only 20% 
of assets in land and buildings which account for nearly 73% of accepted collateral 
(Fleisig et al. 2006). Thus this reform would allow the usage of the remaining vast 
quantity of unused or ‘dead’ capital as collateral.  
The objective of the chapter is to study the effects of these reforms on firms’ 
access to finance.  I have used the Enterprise Survey dataset published by World Bank to 
obtain firm-level data on perceived access to finance and other characteristics of firms in 
88 low and middle countries over the period 2001-2011. Out of this group, twelve 
countries have undergone the said reforms in this time period and now allow intangible 
assets such as machinery, inventory, accounts receivables etc. to be used as collateral.  
The analysis yields a number of policy relevant findings. First, I find that 
broadening the range of assets that can be used as collateral improves access to finance as 
perceived by firms.  However, these effects are more pronounced where these reforms are 
accompanied or followed by movable collateral registries. The above results are not 
surprising. While broadening the collateral base helps the borrowers, registries play a 
significant role in allowing lenders to more accurately evaluate risks, thus avoiding 
adverse selection. This reduces the information asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders, thus ensuring more accurate risk assessment and eventually expanding access to 
finance. 
Secondly, I also examine if this effect differs across firms of different sizes. The 
motivation behind this exercise lies in the fact that smaller firms face greater hurdles in 
posting collateral due to limited resources. Thus it is expected that these reforms are 
targeted towards easing their credit constrains, However I  find that the positive effects of 
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collateral reforms on firms’ perceived access to finance increase in the firm size. This 
raises the possibility that the realized benefits of these reforms are misaligned with the 
main goal of helping smaller firms.  
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Chapter 2: Finance and Property Rights: Exploring Other Directions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a consensus that property rights encourage investment (Besley 1995; 
Knack and Keefer 1995; Johnson et.al 2002), entrepreneurship (Murphy et. al 1991) and 
innovation (Stern, Porter, and Furman 2000). Recently economists have recognized that 
property rights can catalyze “collateral benefits” which can raise growth through indirect 
channels. In particular, a system of strong property rights can enhance efficiency in 
financial sectors. This is intuitive since legislation protecting property often encompasses 
financial contracts (Kumar et. al, 2001; La Porta et. al, 2002; Claessens and Laeven, 
2003; Beck et. al, 2005), and even when it does not, it can improve contracting efficiency 
by allowing borrowers to pledge collateral (Djankov et.al 2007; De Soto, 2001; Besley 
and Ghatak, 2009). Here the direction of causality runs from property rights to financial 
development. But is it possible that the reverse is also true? In other words, could a 
mature financial market provide incentives to better codify and protect individuals’ rights 
to ownership? This is the question I explore.  
There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that institutions are influenced by a 
cluster of exogenous initial conditions (La Porta et. al, 1998, 1999; Acemoglu et. al, 
2001; Berkowitz et. al, 2003), despite this institutions are not immutable. In fact 
institutions have evolved with the economic and social environment. The main argument 
in this chapter revolves around this notion. In some countries, especially those adopting 
market-oriented reforms, the evolution in institutions has been rapid. Based on an index 
published by the Fraser Institute, which ranks the strength of property rights on a 10-
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point scale, property rights strengthened in Chile from 1.1 in 1970 to 7.00 in 2006—a 
rating comparable to that in Belgium and 0.7 points higher than that in Italy. Similarly, 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) report a 40 percent improvement in an index 
assessing constraints on the executive branch of government between the 1970s and 
1990s in 20 countries. There is also evidence that cross-country differences in the quality 
of institutions normally traced to differences initial conditions are eroding. Recent 
evidence suggests a type of “legal convergence” between common law and civil law 
countries, as legislation protecting shareholder’s rights have strengthened in the latter 
(Armour et. al., 2010).  
Sometimes the proximate triggers for institutional reforms have been shifts in 
ideology—Chile under Augusto Pinochet and China under Deng Xiaoping are good 
examples. At the same time triggers could be related to economic conditions. For 
instance Demsetz (1967) and North (1971, 1981) advocate a theory of institutional 
change, where new institutions are formed and existing institutions are mutated when 
opportunities for economic profits arise that cannot be captured within existing 
institutional arrangements. Both argue that technological innovation and new economic 
markets create new profitable opportunities that trigger reform of existing arrangemental 
structures. Here I build on this basic idea; I argue that the development of the financial 
sector can alter the tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of protecting property rights 
which in turn shapes the evolution of property rights institutions.  
This focus on financial markets is not arbitrary. Existing literature hints at a 
number of channels through which the financial sector can influence the evolution of 
institutions such as property rights. For example, certain types of financial reforms, in 
13 
 
 
particular those that relax restrictions on the movement of funds can act as a disciplining 
force on governments. At the same time an increase in foreign participation can act as a 
trigger for institutional improvements by raising their expected benefits and reducing 
incumbents’ incentives and abilities to preserve the status quo. Alternatively, since 
engineering institutions that guard the rights of investors is costly, deep financial markets 
are a prerequisite for certain institutions to be viable (Miletkov and Wintoki 2008). Here I 
forward an argument which ties the evolution of property rights to financial structures, by 
exploring the role of collateral in financial arrangements. As the role of collateral changes 
along the path of financial development, so do individuals’ incentives to invest in the 
protection of property.  
 
I provide a formal theoretical rationale with the help of a simple model of 
financial intermediation with incomplete information. In our economy individuals must 
access external funds to operationalize investments. However, financial intermediaries 
ration credit. As a result some borrowers are denied loans. Faced with this possibility, 
borrowers post assets as collateral to improve the terms and conditions of lending. 
However gaps in the legislative framework allow for encroachment on these assets. This 
generates push back from property owners, which can take many forms. For instance, 
owners could litigate, they could employ private security, or they could pay public 
authorities to protect their assets. Whichever the preferred practice, it comes at a cost that 
increases with the fraction of property owners wish to safeguard.  On the flip side, in 
addition to the obvious gains, protecting property offers non-trivial benefits whose source 
lies in how they affect contractual arrangements in the financial sector. Specifically, the 
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more an individual spends securing property, the more collateral she can post to better the 
terms and conditions of a loan contract. Against this background, I show that the 
marginal net gain from posting collateral increases with the level of financial 
development. Accordingly, mature financial markets generate additional incentives for 
individuals to secure their right to ownership.  
In the analysis that follows, I exploit the above micro foundations to draw 
conclusions at the aggregate level. In doing so, I do not simply aggregate individuals’ 
behaviors, taking decision parameters, such as the cost of enforcing property rights as 
given. Instead I recognize that an individual’s cost of protecting property is affected by 
the decisions other individuals make with regard to protecting their own property. This 
opens our analysis up to a richer set of outcomes for aggregate behavior, characterized by 
multiple equilibria. Significantly, the equilibrium which prevails is uniquely determined 
by the quality of the financial system. The key implication is this: the number of agents in 
the economy initiating safeguards against encroachment increases monotonically with the 
development of the banking system after it has crossed a certain threshold. Below this 
threshold, improvements in the contracting environment have no effect on the degree to 
which society secures private property.  
          The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section two, I present in 
detail the theoretical framework and its implications for the relationship between 
financial development and the degree to which states codify and enforce rights to 
ownership. Section three concludes with some remarks. 
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2.2 Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 The Environment 
In this model, events unfold in a small open economy over two periods. The 
economy is populated with a countably infinite number of agents of unit mass. I suppose 
that these agents are risk neutral, deriving linear utility from consumption which takes 
place at the end of the second period. Agents can derive income from a number of 
sources. One source is an initial endowment,       of assets, which generates income 
payments at the end of the second period. Although these assets offer a gross rate of 
return,    , property rights are not fully enforced in our economy, as a result not all of 
this income,   , may accrue to agents. 
Income can also be derived from business ventures (or projects). Getting these off the 
ground entails a fixed investment,     , in the first period. Although the cost of 
“operationalizing” a project is always the same, projects can be of two types—low risk 
(type-L) and high risk (type-H). Type-L projects yield   -units of output with certainty 
in the second period. Whereas, type-H projects convert   units of investment into   -
units of output with probability          and zero otherwise. I assume that each agent 
faces an ex-ante probability         of being an owner of a type-L project1 and this 
realization is private information. 
Since earnings generated from assets are realized at the end of the second period, agents 
are unable to finance their own projects. Instead they must contract with banks to obtain a 
loan of quantity  . I assume that these banks operate in a competitive environment and 
                                                          
1
 Alternatively I could assume agents are randomly endowed with different abilities. For example, a  -
fraction of agents could be endowed with better skills such that the expected returns to their investments are 
higher. Since skill heterogeneity is not essential to our story, I take a short-cut by assuming that projects 
with different risk characteristics are randomly allocated across individuals.  
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have access to a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds which are priced at the 
exogenously determined world interest rate,  . Since the project-type associated with any 
given loan applicant is private information, contractual agreements between the two 
parties are designed to encourage self-selection on the part of project owners. In 
particular banks will attempt to separate-types by rationing credit to a fraction of 
borrowers. However such contracts can only be constructed if the two types of capital 
producers can be further differentiated. Here I assume that it is feasible for some agents 
to scale down the size of their business ventures so that even if they are rationed or 
unfunded, they can produce a small amount of output using their own labor as an input in 
the production process.
2
 Here I assume that Type-L project owners have this outside 
opportunity, which entitles them to   -units of output. This opportunity is absent for 
Type-H capital producers.
3
 
In this economy, the arrangements which normally ensure that property rights are 
well defined and enforced are absent to some degree. However, these arrangements, 
whether formal or informal, are not exogenously given. Instead they evolve, driven by the 
strength of private incentives to invest in property rights protection. This contrasts with 
the orthodox view where property rights are an exogenous institution derived from a set 
of initial conditions. 
Though property rights are slack, I assume that an owner of property can protect a 
fraction,  , of her initial endowment and the associated income stream from predation by 
                                                          
2
 It is necessary to assume that the value of this outside opportunity is small relative to the size of project 
incomes so there are incentives for borrowers to undertake invests in the first place. 
3
 Strictly, it is only necessary to assume that outside opportunities available to owners of varying project 
types differs. Thus,I could assume that Type-H project owners also have access to this opportunity which 
entitles them to      units of output, where      . Here for notational convenience I have normalized 
   to zero. 
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incurring a monetary and/or time cost in the amount of   . In practice, this cost can take 
various forms, such as litigation costs or the costs of hiring private security firms, etc. In 
addition, I assume that for given legal and institutional structures, the marginal cost of 
protecting property,  , increases with the number of people attempting to do so as it 
increases. This assumption is quite reasonable as increases in the demand for security 
increases the price paid for those services (e.g. legal services). To justify this assumption 
further, I draw support from various legal statistics. Consider for instance a country such 
as India, where in 1950, 1215 cases were filled in India’s Supreme Court. By 2008 that 
number had increased to over 28,000
4
. This increase has led to an enormous backlog of 
cases. As a result, the current courts system is so overstressed that the time-cost of 
litigating is best measured in years and decades
5
 Similarly, there is evidence that in the 
US justice system, increased legislative burden has been accompanied by a steadily rising 
average monetary cost of litigation. In 1982, the combined expenditures (on legal 
services) by local, state and federal governments amounted to $7 billion. By 2006, these 
costs had risen to $46 billion. While there has been a steady increase in the number of 
litigations, the percentage increase in litigation has been much smaller
6
 in size resulting 
in an increase in the average monetary cost of litigation. 
2.2.2 Timing of decision making 
The timing of events in our economy proceeds as follows. Prior to gaining access 
to a project, agents choose a value of  , i.e. they decide how much property they want to 
safeguard from predation. Next agents are randomly and privately assigned a project, 
                                                          
4
 For details, please refer to 229
th
 Report of the Law commission of India 2009, Government of India. 
5
 Currently, writ petitions filed in higher courts of in India take an average of 8-10 years to be heard, while 
the average duration of trials is 15 years (Chakravarti, Megginson, and Yadav, 2007). 
6
 Depending on the courts system, the percentage increase in litigation has varied between 30 and 150 
percent (Annual and Federal Justice statistics, 2005). 
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such that a fraction,  , are assigned to Type-L projects and the remaining       are 
assigned Type-H projects. Once projects are assigned, agents seek to operationalize these 
ventures, by applying for loans from financial intermediaries who operate in a 
competitive environment. The terms and conditions for these loans are influenced by the 
volume of assets,   , in the possession of agents, which can be posted as collateral. In the 
second period, projects generate incomes with which agents pay off loans and also 
consume. The outcomes that transpire from these decisions are determined by solving 
backwards through the sequence of events. In particular, I first determine how the loan 
contract is influenced by the choice of  . This information is then used in sub-sections 4 
and 5 to pin down the optimal value of   for an individual and for the economy as a 
whole. 
2.2.3 Financial Contracts 
 
In the first period, borrowers approach banks for loans to finance investments. 
The idiosyncratic credit risk associated with each borrower is private information. 
However, the aggregate ex ante distribution of project types, along with the associated 
expected returns for each type of investment, and the outside opportunities faced by type-
L versus type-H investors is common knowledge. In addition, when approaching banks, 
loan applicants must reveal the value of their assets,   , and the associated income 
generated from those assets       ̂, both of which are costlessly verifiable by 
financial intermediaries. 
I suppose that banks incur a cost when contracting loan agreements. I denote this 
cost by    . In practice, costs of financial intermediaries include the cost of providing 
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liquidity services, agency costs, such as those associated with processing information, 
enforcing contracts, and screening. I assume that these costs decline along the path of 
financial development. There is certainly an empirical basis for this assumption. Two 
empirical measures of intermediation costs are banks’ overhead expenditure as a 
proportion of total assets and bank’s net interest rate margin. It is well documented that 
both measures tend to be higher in less developed financial sectors (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga 2000; Demigurc-Kunt et al. 2003). Accordingly, I interpret lower values of 
  as corresponding to improvements in the efficiency of the financial system and assume 
the value of   to be known to the financial intermediaries. 
Given the above information, a lender offers contracts to borrowers, the 
acceptance of which implies a binding agreement committing the former to a transfer of 
funds in the amount   to a borrower and the latter to a repayment of these funds from her 
future project income. I assume that financial intermediaries operate in a competitive 
environment and that the terms and conditions of loan contracts offered in the market is 
common knowledge. Accordingly, loan-applicants will only approach financial 
intermediaries if the contracts offered are not dominated by other contracts available in 
the market for loanable funds. Thus, in equilibrium, banks earn zero profits. 
I assume that the contract offered by a financial intermediary can be represented by a 
pair:         for           denotes the gross real lending rate for a contract of type-   
and    [   ] is the probability that a type-   borrower will be granted a loan. For this 
contract, type-   borrowers receive utility   , where    [                    ]  
for                  and        . The first term in this expression is the net 
payoff from risky investments in the event a loan is granted and the project is successful. 
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The second term is the payoff in the event that the project is not funded. It is easy to see that 
since      , the indifference curves of the two types of borrowers satisfy single-crossing 
property in the contract plane. This enables lenders to separate borrowers according to 
their risk types by offering a menu of contracts that are individually rational and incentive 
compatible.
7
 The following proposition fully describes these equilibrium contracts: 
Proposition 1: Let  denote the cost of funds for financial intermediaries. If         
  , the equilibrium separating contract for a given value of   is characterized by:  
   
    
 
     
             ̂
   
                                              
   
                  ̂
        
 
  
                                            
Proof: In competitive equilibrium, banks earn zero economic profit on contracts         
for      . This implies that               ̂      , for      . Here, the first 
term on the left hand side is a financial intermediary’s expected interest earnings in the 
absence of default, when the investment project is successful. The second term is the 
expected amount a financial intermediary can recover by appropriating a borrower’s asset 
   if the project fails and the borrower defaults. The right hand side of the expression is 
the cost of lending, which is comprised of the cost of acquiring funds,   , and the cost of 
intermediation,  .  The expression for   , for       follows immediately from the zero 
profit condition, where we assume     . Throughout the analysis, I assume that there is 
risk associated with lending and therefore the condition   ̂       must hold. This, in 
turn, implies that RL < RH .   
                                                          
7
 For a similar argument, see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Bencivenga and Smith (1993), and Bose and 
Cothren (1996).  
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To obtain the expressions for   , for       note that agents of type-  derive 
expected utility    [           ] from their contracts           , while the 
utility of a type-  borrower from her contract            is    [          
        ]. Now consider a full information scenario where a lender is able to distinguish 
between a type-L and a type-H borrower.  In this case, under competition the offered 
contracts will still earn zero profit for the lenders and also there is no need for a lender to 
deny credit to a borrower.  Let us denote these first best contracts as   
            
and   
             for high and the low risk borrowers respectively.  Since, 
     ,      
        
   and      
        
  . Therefore, in the presence of 
information asymmetry, if first best contracts are offered, it is only the type-H agents who 
has the incentive to misrepresent herself as being of type-  and and not vice-versa. 
Accordingly, there is no need for financial intermediaries to distort the contract for the 
type-  borrowers from their first best in order to induce self selection. Accordingly, even 
in the case of informational asymmetry, type-  borrowers receive their first best contract, 
which is:   
     [
             ̂
   
]      . The contract for the type-   group is then 
determined by solving the following problem: 
  
])1()([)(max LLLLLL xRQCU
LR


  (2) 
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint: 
                         (2a) 
where RL and RH  are given by (1a). Given,           , it is easy to verify that the 
incentive compatibility constraint (2a), must bind in equilibrium. By writing (2a) as an 
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equality, and substituting in expressions for    and    I obtain an expression for    as 
given in 1(b)  
Proposition 1 implies that in equilibrium the separation of borrowers by type is achieved 
by rationing credit to a fraction of low-risk borrowers,       –a result that is well-
known in the “adverse selection” literature. Also note that 
1 1
0L
HQx xr p

 

  
  
 
and 
ˆ(1 ) 1
0L H
H
p z
Qx xr p

 
 
 
  
. 
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. Higher values of   (better 
protection of property) allow borrowers to post more collateral. This reduces lending risk 
and the interest rate financial intermediaries charge to both high and low risk borrowers. 
A similar effect transpires when the cost of intermediation,  , falls. In both cases, 
however, the decline in RH is more than the decline in RL since        . This, makes 
the contract    less attractive to high-risk capital producers and provides banks with an 
opportunity to lower the incidence of credit rationing (i.e. increase the value of   ) while 
maintaining the incentive compatibility condition.  Accordingly the financial sector will 
supply more credit in more financially mature markets and/or in countries with a strong 
system of property rights. 
2.2.4 An Individual’s decision when   (the cost of protecting property) is 
exogenous 
The analysis in the previous section traces a link bet  en financial contracts and 
the value of  , i.e. the extent to which indi  duals protect property. Higher values of   
allow individual’s to post more collateral when applying for loans, thus improving the 
terms and conditions of loan contracts. However the safeguarding property against 
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encroachment entail a cost,     roportional to the value  . Solving for   involves 
optimizing this trade-off. The agent solves this problem with knowledge of the contracts 
and knowledge of the ex-ante probability distribution which determines his chance of 
being endowed with a project of type-  or type- , but not knowing what draw she will 
receive from this distribution ex post. Accordingly, the agent’s problem is to maximize 
the following objective function: 
      ⏟
 
   (  ̃)       (  ̃)    ,   (3) 
where,   ̃ and   ̃ denote a borrower’s life-time income if the borrower is endowed with 
project H or L, respectively. 
Proposition 2: Let      and      denote the maximum and the minimum attainable 
levels of property rights. Further, define      
                   
          
. An agent will 
optimally choose        if    )   and        if       . 
Proof: The expected life-time payoffs to a type-L project is given by the expression, 
  ̃    [          ]̂           ̂     . The first term in this expression is the 
net payoff from the risky project in the event the loan is granted and the project is 
successful. The second term represents the payoff in the event the project is not funded. 
This term includes both asset incomes,   ̂, and income from the outside opportunity,   . 
The equivalent expression for a type-H borrower is given by   ̃      [        
  ̂], where I assume     . Using these expressions along with the expressions for     
and   ,      , from (1a) and (1b), it follows from equation (3) that 
  
  
       . 
Accordingly, an agent should set        and        when        and       , 
respectively  
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These results are easy to interpret. A higher   implies both a welfare gain and a 
welfare loss.  The term      represents the marginal benefit of improving property 
rights. This includes the welfare gain which follows from the reduction in credit risk and 
the consequent improvement in the terms and conditions of loan contracts. Whereas,   
represents the marginal costs associated with property rights improvement. Depending on 
which is greater, the agent sets   at either its maximum or minimum value. 
In presenting these results I have focused on one parameter--  —the cost of 
financial intermediation, Note in particular that        . This follows since a lower 
costs of financial intermediation improve the terms and conditions of loan contracts, such 
that agents receive higher marginal benefit from putting up their future income as 
collateral. Accordingly, the marginal benefit to an agent of securing higher property 
rights is greater the lower this cost. 
2.2.5 Endogenous   and Economy wide Outcomes 
The results obtained above   haracterize the precise conditions under which an 
individual will seek to protect her property. This condition depend on two economy wide 
variables—  and  . For the purposes of this chapter, I treat   as exogenous since our 
principal focus  is on the role of financial development in influencing the quality of 
property rights. However, keeping in line with the stylized facts presented earlier, I treat 
the cost of enforcing property rights as an endogenous outcome dictated by the aggregate 
behavior of individuals. In particular, I postulate that the marginal cost of protecting 
property,  , increases with the number of people protecting their property. Formally, I 
assume that        and        , where   [   ]  denotes the fraction of agents that 
enforce their property right to the fullest extent, i.e., set       . 
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The present framework outlines a scenario where the cost of enforcing property 
rights not only influences the behavior of individuals, but also their behavior in 
aggregate. Clearly, such a scenario raises the possibility of a variety of equilibria, each of 
which is characterized by different levels of property rights. Significantly, the following 
proposition demonstrates how the equilibrium choice varies when   takes a value from 
high to low indicating a transition from low to high levels of financial development. 
Proposition 3: 
(i) There e              al level of financial development,   , such that when 
     the equilibrium in the economy is characterized by a unique behavior 
profile where all agents set       . 
(ii) There exists       such that   the fraction of agents who set        
increases monotonically when   decreases in the interval        . 
Proof: I begin by defining           and          . Evidently,      , since 
       . Further define, δ = δ1 such that          and      such that         . 
Since, 0



 and since      , I have         (Please refer to figure 2.1).   
Suppose that     , and consider a behavior profile where all agents set 
      . Accordingly, 0  .Since, by definition,         , and 0



, it follows 
that         for     .  Therefore, from proposition 2, no individual agent has an 
incentive to deviate from this behavior profile. This is a unique equilibrium. To see this 
consider the behavior profile at the other extreme, i.e. when all agents set       .  
Accordingly,         and        . In this case, from an individual agent’s 
26 
 
 
standpoint it is optimal to deviate and set        and therefore the aggregate 
equilibrium outcome cannot be supported by the behavior profile       . 
Now suppose,          , and consider the pure strategy behavior profile where 
       for all agents. In this case,              . Therefore it is optimal for an 
agent to deviate from her behavior profile and set       . Using a similar argument it 
is easy to see that        cannot also be an equilibrium since        . There exists 
however an equilibrium supported by a mixed-strategy profile. To see this, consider 
            . Since 0)(   ,                  . Now, consider a mixed–
strategy where    fraction of agents set        and the rest set       , so that   
assumes value       which lies between    and   . For a given level of financial 
development,   , the value of    that solves             supports a mixed behavior 
profile as an equilibrium where only    fraction of agents choose       . Finally, 
consider another      such that            and       Suppose that    solves 
           . Since, )()( ab   and  
   , it follows that      . Accordingly, 
in the interval        , the fraction of agents choosing        increases as 
decreases  
To see the intuition underlying proposition 3, note that by choosing to protect 
property, agents receive the added benefit of improved lending terms. The extent of these 
benefits however is contingent upon the level of financial development. If     , this 
benefit from protecting property is so low that that it is optimal for an agent to choose 
       even if she is facing the lowest cost of enforcement,   . As   decreases in the 
interval          , the marginal benefit from protecting property increases  and creates 
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incentives for individuals to enforce property rights. At the same time, an increase in the 
number of individuals choosing to protect property increases the cost of property rights 
enforcement. The benefit arising from a fall in   compensates this increasing marginal 
cost and accommodates more individuals to take initiatives towards stronger property 
rights enforcement. Accordingly, a higher level of financial development gives rise to an 
environment that is suitable for a better property rights institution. 
2.3 Conclusion: 
This essay provides a theoretical model to explore association between finance 
and property rights. The argument is simple: enforcing property rights is costly. However 
stronger property rights enable borrowers to improve the terms of their financial contracts 
by posting collateral. This marginal benefit to securing property increases as financial 
markets mature and the costs of intermediation decline. Thus incentives for individuals 
and society to incur the necessary costs of better enforcing property rights rise. In spite of 
its simplicity, the model produces a rich variety of outcomes as a result of a mutual 
interaction between individual decision making and aggregate behavior. In particular, I 
am able to distinguish between two types of financial development regimes. In a low 
quality regime the effect of finance on the development of property rights is weak. 
However, when financial development crosses a certain threshold, further reductions in 
the cost of financial intermediation catalyze institutional reforms that better secure 
property. 
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Figure 2.1 Multiple Equilibria 
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Chapter 3: Threshold Effects of finance on property rights 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a wide consensus that institutions of property rights tend to be persistent 
and evolve from a cluster of initial conditions. However in the previous section it was 
established that they do indeed change over time owing to changes in some proximate 
factors and one of the factors that contributes to the reforms in institutions of property 
rights is financial development. I established that by developing a simple model of 
financial intermediation with incomplete information. The theory produced a straight-
forward testable implication that the relationship between finance and property rights is 
nonlinear: stronger financial markets can catalyze positive institutional reforms, but only 
after financial markets have crossed into an intermediate range of development. This 
essay provides formal empirical evidence in favor of the nonlinear association between 
finance and property rights.  
A first look at data on property rights and a measure of financial development—
the volume of credit allocated to the private sector by financial intermediaries—suggests a 
pattern of co-movement that is consistent with these predictions. In Figure 3.1 chart an 
index of property rights (constructed by Fraser Institute) over five year intervals from 
1970 to 2005 along with the average volume of private credit to GDP in the five preceding 
years. I divide our data into two equal sized groups, one composed of countries where the 
volume of private credit is less than 30 percent of GDP and the other composed of 
countries where private credit exceeded this 30 percent cut point. In each case, I plot for 
each time period, the median levels of finance and property rights across the countries in 
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our sample. In the low finance group the volume of private credit and property rights do 
not appear to commove, whereas in the high finance group, they do. 
I begin by examining the evidence on nonlinearities in the relationship between 
property rights and finance. In particular, I test for a threshold in this relationship in a 
cross-section of over 100 countries using a procedure suggested in Hansen (1996; 2000). 
Consistent with our theory, our results suggest two distinct regimes. One in which the 
quality of financial systems is poor, and where its effect on property rights is weak, and 
one where the practice of banking has evolved beyond a certain point, such that further 
improvements in access to credit are positively associated with the degree to which 
countries enforce property rights.  
After establishing the existence of a threshold, I separately analyze the 
determinants of property rights for observations in the low and high finance regimes in a 
panel composed of up to 116 countries. The panel GMM analysis confirms earlier finding 
within the cross-section that the effect of finance on property law varies across low and 
high finance regimes, while enabling us to make some structural inferences.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section two, describes data 
and briefly outlines the empirical methodology. In section three, I present the results. 
Finally section four concludes with some remarks. 
3.2 Data and Methodology:  
3.2.1 Outline of the Methodology: 
The first set of evidence I present tests for possible nonlinearity in the form of a 
threshold effects in the finance-property rights relationship. The  approach is based on 
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recent statistical innovations that provide a basis for testing non-nested hypotheses where 
parameters are unidentified under the null (Hansen, 1996; Hansen, 2000). In particular, I 
estimate variations of the following regression: 
 
       [       ]      [         ]    .  (1) 
 
The above specification allows the association between financial development, 
  , and property rights,   , in country   to vary with   .In particular observations are 
divided into two regimes depending on whether the threshold variable, financial 
development, is smaller or larger than the threshold  . The indicator function         
allows the slope coefficients on financial development to vary across the two regimes. 
The unknown threshold   is estimated by minimizing a loss function across values 
of    (see Hansen, 1996; 2000 for details). Testing the assertion that there are distinct 
regimes across which finance has markedly differing effects on the enforcement of 
property rights amounts to testing a hypothesis about  . Since   is not identified under the 
null hypothesis (“no threshold”), the asymptotic distribution of classical test statistics is 
not chi-squared. This is problem has been investigated in Hansen (1996) who suggests a 
test based on difference between the sum of squared errors under the null,   , and 
alternatives,     ̂ , i.e.   
       ̂ 
    ̂    ⁄
. The distribution of   is non-standard and depends 
on nuisance parameters. Hansen (1996) however shows that a bootstrap procedure can 
approximate this distribution, so p-values based on simulation are asymptotically valid. 
Evidence of threshold effects and nonlinearities may be suggestive however they 
are not a basis from which I can make structural inferences. The difficulty is that 
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financial development is endogenous. In addressing this issue I face a hurdle. 
Instrumental variables estimation within endogenous threshold models is difficult. 
Estimation methods are available only with certain restrictions (Caner and Hansen, 
2004).  
Here I present a second set of evidence where I take an alternative approach. I 
attempt to resolve the issue of identification within a panel framework using the 
Arellano-Bover system GMM estimator. I link our panel analysis to the earlier analysis of 
thresholds, by splitting the data into two sub-samples based on the previously generated 
threshold estimates. Thus I estimate two sets of panel regressions; one for the low finance 
group for which       ̂ and one for the high finance group where       ̂. The 
conjecture is that financial development will have little effect on the degree to which 
governments enforce property rights in countries where financial markets are 
underdeveloped to begin with. Thus the size of the coefficient on the finance variable in 
subsample of panel regressions where       ̂ should be small and may be statistically 
insignificant. By contrast, in countries where financial market development has crossed a 
threshold, further advancements in the financial sector should encourage stronger 
property rights legislation and enforcement. Thus for the sample where       ̂, I would 
expect to isolate a strong positive relationship between financial development and 
property rights within countries over time. 
3.2.2 Data on property rights and finance: 
Measuring Property Rights: 
Measures of property rights-enforcement fall into two classes. One class aims to 
capture the security of intangible assets—specifically intellectual property. Another 
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class provides an assessment of the scope of laws and regulations governing the 
security of property as they apply more generally. Since our focus is not exclusively 
on intellectual property, it makes sense to draw from this latter group. Our primary 
measure of property rights is an index assembled by James Gwartney and Robert 
Lawson and published by the Fraser Institute (with the Cato Institute as its US 
partner) in their Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report. 
An important feature of the index is that it does not simply reflect laws on the 
books, but also the overall legal environment as it relates to the protection of property 
rights and the overall quality of legal institutions. Countries are rated on a scale from 
0 to 10—zero being the lowest—on the degree to which the judiciary is independent 
and free of government interference, on the impartiality of the courts, on the basis of 
the protection of property, the degree of military interference, the integrity of the 
legal system, and the degree of enforcement of legal contracts and the extent of 
regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property. 
The large cross-country dimension of the Fraser Institute’s data (141 countries) is 
useful since our intent here is to identify complex, potentially nonlinear, relationships. 
Unfortunately drawing structural inferences from cross-country analyses is difficult. 
Fortunately, these data also offer a time dimension. They are available for a 37-year 
period from 1970 to 2007. Between 1970 and 2000 these data were reported at five-
year intervals, since 2000 however these data are published at an annual frequency. 
The time-series component of these data provides a basis for resolving the 
identification issue within a panel framework, while also allowing us to control for 
country-specific effects. 
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While the presumption is that the bulk of variation in property rights is across 
countries, this is not in fact the case. In fact the within-variation over time in the 
Fraser Institute’s measure is almost as large as the between-variation across countries 
(Table 3.1). Even though the median country rating has changed very little, increasing 
from 6.25 in 1970 to 6.7 in 2005 (the average rating also changed only slightly from 
6.1 to 6.6), in some countries the extent of enforcement of property rights has 
changed substantially. In Chile, for instance, under Pinochet property rights were 
strengthened. This respect for contractual agreements continued even in the aftermath 
of that regime. As a result between 1970 and 2005, Chile’s property rights rating 
increased by 4.11 points. By contrast Venezuela, which has introduced various land 
reforms, has seen its property rights rating drop by 2.16 points since 1970. 
An alternative measure of property rights is the rating published by the Heritage 
Foundation. These data have been used extensively in the literature (La Porta et al., 
1999; 2002; Acemoglu et. al., 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). This measure 
provides an assessment of individuals’ abilities to accumulate private property, which 
is secured by transparent legislation and government enforcement, together with the 
likelihood of expropriation, the efficiency of the judiciary, the presence of corruption 
within the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. Countries are rated on a scale 
from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating stronger property rights. For our 
purposes, it is useful to rescale these data from 0 to 10. 
Although these data are available for a large cross-section, their time series 
dimension is short; ratings on property rights are available on an annual basis starting 
in 1995, making these data less than ideal for panel analysis. In the sensitivity section 
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below I consider robustness exercises that focus specifically on the cross-country 
dimension of these data. 
Measures of Financial Development: 
The World Bank’s Financial Structure Database provides data on a wide array of 
country-level financial indicators. Of these, measures of the size of the financial 
system continue to be the most widely used proxy for efficiency of financial markets. 
Research has focused in particular on the volume of credit supplied by the financial 
system to the private sector (normalized by GDP). The intuition underlying this 
measure is straightforward: financial systems that allocate more credit to the private 
sector are likely to monitor firms more closely and exercise greater corporate control 
(Beck et al., 2000). The bulk of our data analysis is based on this indicator. However, 
in some sensitivity exercises, I also consider two alternative measures of financial 
depth—the sum of currency, demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and 
other financial intermediaries (normalized by GDP); and the ratio of commercial bank 
assets to the sum of commercial and central bank assets. Both of these measures have 
also been used extensively in empirical financial research (see Beck et al., 2000 for 
details). 
3.3 Results: 
3.3.1 An Initial Look at the Data 
In this section, I provide evidence on the relation between finance and property 
rights. I present this in stages. I begin by regressing property rights against the logarithm 
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of finance
8
 and a set of other controls. I do not fully parameterize this relationship. 
Instead I estimate a partially linear additive model (Stone, 1985), where the finance 
variable enters the equation additively, but is estimated using univariate smoothers, so 
our regression equation takes the following form: 
                    ,    (2) 
here    is the average of the Fraser Institute’s property rights rating in country   over the 
sample period—from 1970 to 2005—and    is the average volume of private credit to 
GDP (over the same period).  
At this stage I keep our specification simple. In particular,    is composed of a 
dummy for British legal origin, a country’s latitude and ethnic fractionalization. This 
specification will form the baseline model like chapter one and is motivated by three 
predominant views on historical determinants of property rights. This specification will 
form our baseline model and with the exception of a dummy for Catholicism, which I 
include later, the specification is identical to that considered by Ayyagari, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2006). Though parsimonious, this specification is motivated by 
three predominant views on historical determinants of property rights.  
The first of these argues that differences in legal traditions influenced how 
property rights evolved (Hayek, 1960; La Porta et. al., 1998). Proponents of this view 
draw sharp distinctions between civil law and common law. Under British common law, 
emphasis falls on the rights of individuals to ownership and not on the rights of the state. 
Moreover, unlike the French (and German) civil code, common law does not limit 
jurisprudence, which has allowed laws to adapt more efficiently to changing contractual 
                                                          
8
 The distribution of data on the volume of private credit as well as other measures of the size of financial 
sectors are typically positively skewed, as such it is typical to transform these data by taking logarithms. 
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needs. 
By contrast Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001; 2002) argue that what 
matters is not the identity of the colonial power, but rather their proclivity to establish 
institutions. In inhospitable environments, Europeans introduced extractive institutions, 
which did not protect the property rights of individuals. Often these were countries close 
to the equator with tropical climates and a high incidence of disease. Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001; 2002) argue using mortality rates amongst European colonists as an 
exogenous determinant of property rights. Here I use latitude instead in our baseline 
specification, as data on the latter are only available for a significantly smaller set of 
countries. 
A third view links ethnic composition to the development of property rights. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ruling classes in ethnically diverse countries 
attempt to expropriate resources from other ethnic factions. Thus these economies also 
tend to have weaker institutions. 
While the additive model in (2) does not provide a basis for testing for threshold 
effects, its flexibility provides an important exploratory foundation which may reveal 
nonlinearities in the relationship between property rights and finance. Of interest is the 
pattern of variation of the smoother      . In particular, here I am interested whether this 
variation suggests an approximate classification of observations into distinct regimes. 
A plot of the nonparametric smoother,       , is presented in Figure 3.2. The plot 
provides some evidence of nonlinear structure in the relationship between property rights 
and finance. In particular, the nonparametric smooth       appears approximately kinked 
when the volume of private credit is roughly between 20 and 22 percent of GDP. 
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Although this evidence does not provide a formal basis for rejecting linearity, it is 
suggestive. The ratio of private credit averaged less than 22 percent of GDP in 
approximately 35 percent of the countries in the sample. Within that group the 
association between private credit to GDP and property rights is essentially zero. In the 
complementary sub-sample, this association is strongly positive. 
Below I present evidence which formally tests for the presence of threshold 
effects in the relationship between finance and property rights. 
3.3.2 Threshold Regressions 
In this section I apply methods developed in Hansen (1996; 2000), to split the 
data into two groups, based on the measure of financial development. To this end I 
augment and then estimate equation (4), using additional regressors, beginning with the 
baseline specification. I then extend this baseline in various ways.  
First, I build on the endowment theory of property rights by including a measure 
of mortality rates amongst early European settlers (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 
2001). Next, I consider the importance of religious identity—Catholicism in particular—
as a historical determinant of property rights. The argument here is that Catholicism is 
associated with societies where bonds between the church and state limited the 
development of property rights (Putnam, 1993; Landes, 1998; Stulz & Williamson, 
2003). 
In the third specification, I examine the importance of political factors in shaping 
the rights to ownership in countries. North and Weingast (1989) argue that constraints on 
governments’ abilities to abrogate individuals rights to ownership are associated with 
stronger property rights. Thus I introduce a control for constraints on the executive. 
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Finally, I consider the role of economic influences on property rights, by 
extending the specification to include real per capita income, as well as trade and 
financial openness. Gradstein (2004) argues that higher real per-capita incomes are 
associated with stronger property rights, since higher incomes relate to abilities of 
governments to invest in institutional development. Income may matter also for the 
development of intellectual property rights (Maskus, 2000). Others have argued that 
greater openness disciplines governments and begets better institutions (Wei, 2000). This 
view has been extended to include financial globalization (Stulz, 2004). The argument 
here is that greater capital mobility weakens the ability of states to expropriate, by 
providing domestic investors with opportunities to channel funds abroad. 
I estimate two versions of equation (1). First I estimate the following model:  
 
       [       ]      [         ]    
     ,  (3a) 
i.e. I  augment (1) using additional regressors,   , but constrain the slope coefficients on 
these variables to be the same across the two regimes. In the case, where    and    are 
uncorrelated, constraining the coefficients on    will not bias the test, while at the same 
time centering attention on the finance variable. Thus any evidence of a threshold is 
based solely on the additional explanatory power provided when I allow the effect of 
finance to change across regimes. Unfortunately, in general    and    will not be 
uncorrelated, and the coefficients on our other explanatory variables,   , could also 
switch across regimes. Restricting the model coefficients on    could therefore impart a 
bias in estimates of    and   . If this bias is not uniform across regimes, and there is no 
reason to think why it would be, then our test may erroneously point to a threshold when 
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none are present. Thus, in addition to the restricted model (3a), I also consider the case 
where the model parameters on each of our controls are allowed to vary freely across 
regimes, i.e. I estimate the following specification: 
 
           
    [       ]          
    [         ]    . (3b) 
 
The results from these exercises are arranged across two panels in Table 3.2. The 
dependent variable is the average of the Fraser Institute index from 1970 to 2005. In 
Panel A, I allow the coefficient on the intercept and finance variables only to change 
across regimes, i.e. I impose cross-regime restrictions on our additional controls. In Panel 
B, I estimate a model without imposing cross-regime restrictions. To save space, in Panel 
B I only report the coefficients on the finance variable. 
I find strong evidence in favor of a split (based on finance) in every model 
specification when I impose cross-regime restrictions on our other model parameters 
(Table 3.2, Panel A). In each case, I can reject the null of linearity at one percent or 
better. The strength of this evidence reflects large differences in the effect of finance on 
property rights. In the low regime, the coefficient on finance is 0.023 and statistically 
insignificant. In the high finance regime, the coefficient on finance increases to 1.315 
with a t-statistic larger than 4.5. 
In the baseline specification, the regimes split when the volume of credit to the 
private sector is about 32 percent [=exp(3.49)-1] of GDP. As such approximately 57 
percent of the countries lie in the low finance regime. Across the specifications, the range 
of variation in the threshold parameter is between 22 [=exp(3.13)-1] and 36 percent 
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[=exp(3.60)-1] of GDP. The size of the coefficient on finance also varies across 
specifications however importantly in the low regime the effect of finance is not 
statistically different from zero in four of the five model specifications. In the one case 
where its effect is statistically significant, the coefficient is negative. By contrast in high 
finance regimes, the coefficient on finance is always positive and strongly statistically 
significant. 
The results are qualitatively similar when I relax cross-regime restrictions. In 
most cases, the finance threshold occurs at roughly the median level of private credit 
ratios—between 31 and 32 percent of GDP. Moreover, evidence of a split is strong. 
Importantly also the pattern of variation in the effect of finance across regimes is both 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our results based on cross-regime restrictions, 
except perhaps when I control for European settler mortality rates, which significantly 
shrinks our sample. 
The coefficients on some of other control variables are consistent with earlier 
research. For instance I find that countries further from the equator tend to have stronger 
property rights. There is strong support also for the view that British legal traditions have 
positively influenced the development of property rights. On average countries with 
British legal traditions scored between 0.54 and 0.714 points higher on the 10-point 
Fraser scale (Table 3.2, Panel A). Thus while the relationship between British legal 
traditions and the development of property rights may be statistically important, 
quantitatively its effect is small. Consistent also with earlier evidence I find that countries 
with high mortality rates amongst European colonists developed weaker property rights 
institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; 2002). The log of European settler 
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mortality rates varies between a low of 2.15 in Australia, which receives a property rating 
of 8.32, and a high of 7.99 in Mali, which receives a score of 4.41. Based on my 
estimates, I can attribute about a third of this difference to the variation in settler 
mortality rates. By contrast the effect of political constraints is quantitatively more 
significant. On average, countries with strong constraints on the chief executive receive a 
score that is approximately 3 points higher on the Fraser index.  
I find also that higher incomes and increased trade openness are associated with 
stronger enforcement of property rights (Table 3.2, Panel A, column 5b), although the 
effect of trade openness is not statistically significant. Increased financial globalization 
by contrast is associated with weaker property rights, which is the opposite of what I 
might expect, although this effect is insignificant. 
While the evidence of thresholds is consistent with our claim of nonlinearity, it is 
also open to alternative interpretations. At issue is the proximate determinant of the 
nonlinearity in the finance-property rights relationship. Does this relationship hinge on 
the level of financial development, or is it the case that countries with weaker financial 
markets are also less developed, where in general, the quality of data is worse, and 
relationships appear weaker? That is, is the relevant threshold variable finance, or is it 
income? 
Choosing between these correlated alternatives is difficult. Evidence of linearity 
is easily rejected in favor of income-based thresholds [Table 3.3, columns (1a) and (1b) 
and (2a) and (2b)]. The estimated cut point varies. In a specification with cross-regime 
restrictions, it is $1,188. When I relax these coefficient restrictions it is $2,540. Yet while 
specification matters for the composition of low- and high-income groups, the effect of 
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finance on property rights is not very sensitive to this variation in cut points. In the low-
income regime the coefficient on finance is 0.30 and statistically insignificant and in the 
high regime it varies between 1.22 and 1.26. Both qualitatively and quantitatively these 
coefficients are similar to those reported in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, columns (3a) and 
(3b) and(4a) and (4b), where I use the same specification, but allow finance to be the 
threshold variable. 
Based on this evidence it is not clear whether the threshold variable is finance or 
income. At the same time it is not immediately obvious how I might jointly test for 
linearity versus each of these alternatives. Here I consider a two- step approach. In the 
first step, I separately estimate the cut points in finance,  ̂ , and income  ̂ . These 
estimates are obtained from the constrained and unconstrained threshold regressions 
reported in Table 3.3. In the second step, I assume these thresholds are known, estimate 
the following regression: 
 
            [ (    ̂ )]      [ (    ̂ )]        
                   
 
and then test for the statistical significance of the parameters    and   . The function 
 (    ̂ ) is a dummy for countries in the high finance regime and  (    ̂ ) is a 
dummy for countries with per-capita incomes greater than  ̂ . This specification allows 
the effect of finance to shift as financial credit and income cross their respective critical 
values  ̂  and  ̂ . 
Although this approach is somewhat ad hoc, that the coefficient on the interaction 
between finance and high-income countries,   , is either not statistically significant or is 
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negative [Table 3.4A, columns (1) and (2) and Table 2.4B] is suggestive. Thus either 
income has no effect on the finance-property rights relationship, as our results in column 
(2) of Table 2.4A suggest, or it does, but only for very low income countries, and in the 
opposite direction. By contrast the effect of finance does appear to increase when the 
volume of credit exceeds a critical threshold  ̂ . There is a then a tentative basis for 
attributing the nonlinearity observed in Table 2.3 to financial development rather than 
income. 
However, importantly a “kink” in the finance-property rights relationship is not 
by itself direct evidence in support of causality, as within each regime the direction of 
causality could be running from property rights to stronger financial market development. 
Thus establishing the fact that finance “causes” a change in property rights in nonlinear 
fashion would require dealing with identification issues in the panel frame work.  
3.3.3 Panel Regressions 
Since it is difficult to isolate the structural component in the relationship between 
property rights and finance in the cross-section, I attempt to generate some traction on 
this issue by exploiting the time-series variation in the Fraser Institute’s data. In 
particular, I re-estimate the property rights-finance relationship in a panel, using as 
instruments, lags of the endogenous regressors. I use the system-GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and the justification of use of the 
approach is same as chapter one , i.e. it is well suited for persistent macroeconomic data.  
The property rights equation no longer includes country-specific effects. Hence 
the baseline is simply a regression of property rights in one of eight time periods   
              , against the average private credit to GDP ratio in the each of five 
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preceding years. In addition, I extend this specification by first including controls for 
partisanship and then for initial period real per-capita income, trade and financial 
openness. Since my goal is to examine how the effect of finance on property rights 
changes across regimes, I split our data into two subsamples using our earlier threshold 
estimate (private credit     percent of GDP) and estimate the relationship between 
property rights and finance within each subsample. 
As a benchmark I begin by estimating this relationship for the full sample of 
countries, using fixed effects as well as the system GMM procedure. Based on these 
findings, it is evident that financial development is strongly correlated with stronger 
property rights over time (Table 3.5, column 1). Thus while institutional change 
sometimes occurs slowly, there is enough time variation in the measure of property rights 
with which I can identify a statistically meaningful relationship with financial 
development. The second-order serial correlation in the residuals of property rights 
regression should be absent, and the results suggest that they are (Table 2.5, column 2). 
There is therefore a tentative basis from which I might conclude that stronger 
financial markets lay the groundwork for stronger property law. But does this relationship 
change depending on the level of financial development as our theory predicts? To 
examine this issue, I split our data into low and high finance regimes and re-estimate our 
property rights equation in each sub-sample. Across these sub-samples there are sharp 
differences in the effect of finance on property rights. In the low regime the coefficient on 
finance ranges between 0.02 and 0.2. In the high regime this range of variation is between 
1.5 and 2.0 and the coefficients are highly statistically significant. In each of the 
specifications, in each sub-sample, second order serial correlation is absent and our 
46 
 
 
results also pass the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. 
These results suggest that increases in the volume of credit supplied by the 
banking sector did not bring forth stronger property rights in countries where the quality 
of finance was generally low. However, where financial conditions were moderately 
strong to begin with, improvements in the contracting environment paved the way for 
stronger property rights.  
3.3.4 Robustness 
Although the findings hold in samples differing in country-coverage and 
specification, questions related to robustness remain. A particularly important criticism is 
that two key variables—the quality of financial intermediation services and the quality of 
institutions—are measured with error. Since neither is observed directly, there is little 
scope for addressing this criticism in a completely satisfactory manner, however at a 
minimum I might insist that the results are robust across viable alternatives. 
In Table 3.6, I provide additional evidence of nonlinearities in the finance-
property rights relationship. The results are arranged in panels. In Panel A, I continue to 
measure financial development using the logarithm of the volume of credit provided to 
the private sector, however in addition to Fraser Institute data; I also consider the index of 
property rights published by the Heritage Foundation. In Panels B and C, I vary the 
measure of financial development. In particular, I consider the log of the ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP, as well as the log of the ratio of commercial bank assets to total banks 
assets. In each case, the relevant specification is the baseline, with and without cross-
regime restrictions. The cells are shaded such that darker cells correspond to instances 
when the threshold is statistically significant, the effect of finance is statistically 
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indistinguishable from zero in the low regime and positive and statistically significant in 
the high regime. Cells receiving a lighter shade satisfy two of these criteria. 
The results point to strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between property 
rights and finance when the latter is measured as the logarithm of the volume credit 
provided to the private sector. The threshold level of finance consistently splits the 
sample within the 55
th
 to 60
th
 percentile range. Moreover the coefficients on finance in 
the low and high regimes are of similar across the different measures of property rights. 
Similar nonlinearities are evident when banking development is assessed on the basis of 
the relative volume of commercial bank assets. In these cases the coefficient on finance is 
an order of magnitude larger in part because the splits occur at higher values of our 
threshold variable, and in part because property rights are highly responsive to increases 
in banking development in the high finance regime. For instance, in column (2) of Panel 
C, the coefficient on finance increases from 0.66 to 7.96 as the percent share of 
commercial bank assets increases beyond 85 percent of total bank assets. A ten percent 
increase in this measure will therefore increase a country’s rating on the Fraser Institute 
scale by 0.9 points. 
Although the liquid liabilities of the financial sector are strongly correlated with 
the volume of credit allocated to the private sector (0.85), evidence of thresholds is 
weaker in this case. Even so the evidence is suggestive. The simulated p-values in our 
regressions are borderline significant. Moreover, the effect of finance in the high regime 
increases from zero to positive and significant in all cases but one. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
Existing literature offers evidence suggesting that the cross-country variation in 
property rights can account for much of the international variation in the development of 
financial markets. In this chapter I have put forward empirical evidence and produce a 
rich variety of outcomes and have been able to distinguish between two types of financial 
development regimes. In a low quality regime the effect of finance on the development of 
property rights is weak. However, when financial development crosses a certain 
threshold, further development in finance catalyzes institutional reforms that better secure 
property. 
I examine the relationship between finance and property rights in a cross-section 
of over 100 countries. The results are consistent with nonlinearities in this relationship. In 
particular, I find that when the ratio of private credit to GDP is below 32 percent, its 
association with measures of property rights enforcement is weak. Above this threshold 
the relationship between these two variables is strong. Further using data on a panel of 
countries spanning 35 years, I show that the exogenous component in financial 
development helps predict stronger property rights in countries where credit allocation to 
the private sector has exceeded the 32 percent threshold. 
The results presented in this chapter may also be viewed within the broader 
context of potential linkages between the real and the financial sector of an economy. 
Over the past decade a substantial body of research has attempted to identify channels 
through which financial markets shape growth prospects in countries. There is a general 
consensus that financial development is conducive to growth because it mobilizes savings 
for investments, creates an opportunity to pool risks, improves the allocative efficiency, 
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and lowers transaction costs. In this chapter I point to another, quite different, channel 
through which financial development may foster economic performance—namely, by 
creating incentives for countries to strengthen their property rights. 
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Table 3.1 Within and Between Country Variation in Property Rights 
 
Notes: Number of observations = 840, number of countries = 141, average number of observations per 
country = 5.96. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall Between Within
Mean 5.96
Standard Deviation 1.18 0.90 0.73
Minimum 2.30 3.49 3.45
Maximum 9.08 8.58 8.13
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TABLE  3.2: Results from Threshold Regressions 
 
Notes: standard errors and p-values associated with linearity test reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, ***, respectively. The dependent variable is the 
average of the Fraser Institute’s property rights rating from 1970 to 2005. Financial development, trade 
openness and financial integration are averages of each over this sample period. In each case I take a log 
transformation of those data, except for finance where I take the following alternative transformation: 
log(1+finance). The log of income and constraints on the executive are the initial 1970 values. All other 
variables are country-specific. In each regression the log of financial development measure serves as the 
threshold variable. Estimation was performed in Gauss using a code adapted from Hansen (2000).  
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.6
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.6
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.13
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.13
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Finance 0.023 1.315*** -0.03 1.545*** 0.376 1.945*** -0.552** 1.007*** -0.305 1.087***
(0.16) (0.29) (0.25) (0.59) (0.30) (0.31) (0.25) (0.27) (0.21) (0.29)
Ethnic Fractionlization
Latitude
UK Legal Origin
Settler Mortality
Catholic Countries
Constraints on the Executive
Income
Trade Openness
Financial Integration
Number of Countries in Regime 58 43 43 14 19 48 44 37 52 40
p-value
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.47
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.47
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Finance 0.181 1.097*** 0.161 0.72 0.12 1.289*** -0.264 0.681*** -0.009 0.894***
(0.15) (0.29) (0.21) (0.46) (0.22) (0.31) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.24)
Number of Countries in Regime 58 43 40 17 32 35 44 37 52 40
p-value
Threshold Regressions
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B: Average Property Rights, 1970 to 2005. No Cross Regime Restrictions
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.572*** 0.714*** 0.54*** 0.6***
Panel A: Average Property Rights, 1970 to 2005. Cross Regime Restrictions
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.042*** 0.017 0.047*** 0.04*** 0.041***
0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.004
2.917***
(0.19) (0.27) (0.20) (0.20)
-0.221*
(0.13)
0.077
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.68)
0.301**
(0.13)
0.317
(0.25)
-0.019
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TABLE 3.3 :Income as a Threshold Variable 
 
Notes: standard errors and p-values associated with linearity test reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, ***, respectively. The dependent variable is the average of the Fraser 
Institute’s property rights rating from 1970 to 2005. Financial development is also averaged over the sample period 
and transformed as follows: log(1+finance). Income is the log of the 1970 value. All other variables are country-
specific.  
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Low 
Regime: 
Income ≤ 
7.08
High 
Regime: 
Income > 
7.08
Low 
Regime: 
Income ≤ 
7.84
High 
Regime: 
Income > 
7.84
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Finance 0.3 1.226*** 0.302 1.255*** -0.25 1.146*** 0.012 0.952***
(0.29) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.28) (0.19) (0.26)
Ethnic Fractionlization 0.008** -0.001 0.004 0
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Latitude 0.026 0.037*** 0.015 0.044***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
UK Legal Origin 0.756*** 0.611*** 0.614** 0.8***
(0.29) (0.24) (0.27) (0.28)
Income -0.37* 0.606** 0.083 0.497*
(0.21) (0.26) (0.13) (0.26)
Number of Countries in Regime 19 73 36 56 44 37 44 37
p-value
Dependent Variable: Average Property Rights, 1970 to 2005
Threshold Regressions
(0.16)
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Cross Regime Restrictions Unrestricted Cross Regime Restrictions Unrestricted
0.555***
(0.13)
(0.19) (0.21)
0.293**
(0.01) (0.01)
0.636*** 0.638***
(0.00) (0.00)
0.035*** 0.037***
0.001 0.004
Income Thresholds Finance Thresholds
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TABLE 3.4 A:Income vs. Finance Thresholds 
 
 
TABLE 3.4 B: Income vs. Finance Thresholds Coefficients on Finance in Various Regimes 
 
 
Notes: standard errors and p-values associated with linearity test reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, ***, respectively. The dependent variable is the average of the Fraser 
Institute’s property rights rating from 1970 to 2005. Financial development is also averaged over the sample period 
and transformed as follows: log(1+finance). Income is the log of the 1970 value. All other variables are country-
specific.
(1) (2)
Finance 0.713** 0.031
(0.28) (0.19)
Finance * High Finance 0.338*** 0.4***
(0.10) (0.12)
Finance * High Income -0.416*** 0.011
(0.15) (0.13)
Ethnic Fractionlization 0.001 0.004
(0.00) (0.00)
Latitude 0.032*** 0.038***
(0.01) (0.01)
UK Legal Origin 0.631*** 0.733***
(0.21) (0.24)
Income 0.471** 0.241
(0.20) (0.20)
R-squared 0.8157 0.7917
Dependent Variable: Average Property Rights, 1970 to 2005
Low Finance High Finance Low Finance High Finance
Low Income 0.714** 1.052*** 0.032 0.432***
(0.28) (0.23) (0.19) (0.17)
High Income 0.298** 0.636*** 0.043 0.444***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.24) (0.18)
Significance of Coefficients from Column (1) Significance of Coefficients from Column (2)
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TABLE 3.5: Results from Panel Regressions 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is Fraser Institute index of property rights in country   in time period   1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 
2005. For each,  , finance, partisanship, trade openness and financial integration are averages in the five preceding years, while income is 
measured in 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. Income is measured in logs and for our measure of financial development I take the 
alternative transformation log(1+finance). 
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Fixed Effects Arellano-Bover Low High Low High Low High Low High
Finance 0.282*** 1.044*** 0.197 2.032*** -0.386 1.723*** 0.026 1.49*** -0.598** 1.416***
(0.106) (0.109) (0.778) (0.241) (0.312) (0.275) (0.209) (0.261) (0.271) (0.251)
Partisanship 0 0.276* 0.189 0.043
(0.205) (0.148) (0.142) (0.119)
Income 0.887*** 1.704*** 1.135*** 1.953***
(0.227) (0.237) (0.243) (0.266)
Trade Openness 0.426 0.316 0.521 0.885
(0.615) (0.336) (0.584) (0.595)
Financial Integration 0.512** -0.045 0.377 -0.076
(0.245) (0.047) (0.231) (0.057)
Number of Countries 116 116 85 68 63 53 64 51 50 40
Number of Observations 644 644 341 303 180 211 263 223 149 167
First Order Serial Correlation (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Second Order Serial Correlation (0.46) (0.89) (0.42) (0.67) (0.53) (0.77) (0.23) (0.23) (0.85)
Sargan Test (0.11) (0.32) (0.37) (0.36) (0.29) (0.96) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Full Sample Arellano-Bover Regressions Based on Sample Splits
Dependent Variable: Property Rights Index, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005
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TABLE 3.6. Threshold Regressions: Robustness to Alternative Measures 
 
 
Notes: standard errors and p-values associated with linearity test reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
marked with *, **, ***, respectively. The dependent variables are the average value of the Fraser Institute index from 1970 to 2005 
and the average of the Heritage Foundation index from 1995 to 2005. The regression specification follows the baseline model, where 
each of the variables except finance is country-specific. Finance is measured as the log of the private credit to GDP ratio, the log of 
liquid liabilities to GDP and the log of commercial assets to total bank assets. In each regression the relevant financial development 
measure serves as the threshold variable. Estimation was performed in Gauss using a code adapted from Hansen (2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.34
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.34
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.47
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.47
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.49
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.49
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.47
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.47
Effect of Finance 0.023 1.315*** 0.219 1.038*** 0.181 1.097*** 0.431 0.800***
(0.16) (0.29) (0.32) (0.34) (0.15) (0.29) (0.30) (0.36)
Number of Countries in Regime 58 43 59 46 58 43 59 46
p-value
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.73
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.73
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.38
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.38
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.73
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.73
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
3.80
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
3.80
Effect of Finance -0.189 0.996*** 1.601*** 2.096*** -0.037 0.985** 0.435 1.217***
(0.34) (0.33) (0.55) (0.36) (0.34) (0.38) (0.49) (0.39)
Number of Countries in Regime 59 30 34 59 59 30 54 39
p-value
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
4.46
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
4.46
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
4.00
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
4.00
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
4.46
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
4.46
Low 
Regime: 
Finance ≤ 
4.08
High 
Regime: 
Finance > 
4.08
Effect of Finance 0.656* 7.959** 0.252 6.500*** 0.692* 6.544 0.194 5.823***
(0.38) (3.66) (0.77) (1.13) (0.38) (4.02) (0.69) (1.19)
Number of Countries in Regime 61 38 15 88 61 38 18 85
p-value
Cross Regime Restrictions No Cross Regime Restrictions
Cato Heritage Foundation
(0.00)
Panel A Measure of Finance: Private Credit to GDP
Panel B Measure of Finance: Liquid Liabilities to GDP
Panel C Measure of Finance: Commerical Bank Assets / (Sum of Commerical and central Bank Assets)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Cato Heritage Foundation
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 3.7 Data Appendix 
 
Variable Description 
 Measures of Property Rights 
Fraser Institute Index Rating of private property ranging from 0 to 10, higher values indicating stronger property 
rights. Source: economic Gwartney, J., Hall, J., Lawson, R, (2009). Freedom of the world: 
2009 annual report, Fraser Institute. 
 
Heritage Foundation Index Rating of private property ranging from 0 to 100 rescaled to 0 to 10; higher values 
indicating stronger property rights. Source: the index of economic freedoms: freedom#8, 
property rights, Heritage Foundation. 
 Measures of Financial Development 
Private Credit Credit supplied by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by nominal GDP at 
market prices. Financial structure database. 
 
Liquid Liabilities Ratio of broad money to nominal GDP. Financial structure database. 
 
Bank Assets Ratio of commercial bank domestic assets to the sum of commercial and central bank 
domestic assets. Financial structure database. 
 Other Explanatory Variables 
British Legal Origin Indicator for English common law tradition. Easterly (2001) original source La Porta et. al., 
1999. 
Ethnic Fractionalization Probability that two randomly selected individuals will not speak the same language. 
Easterly (2001).. 
Distance from Equator Absolute value of the latitude of a country. Easterly (2001). 
Mortality Rates The log of mortality rates within European settlements. Acemoglu et. al. (2001). 
Constraints on the Executive Measures the feasibility of a change in government policy based on the presence of 
independent branches of government with veto power. These data were drawn from Henisz 
(2000). And updated from author’s web-site. 
Religious Identity Primary religion—Catholicism. CIA world fact book. 
Initial Income Real GDP per capita adjusted for differences in purchasing power (series rgdpl, Penn world 
tables 6.2). 
Trade Openness Ratio of trade to GDP. World development indicators CD Rom (2002). 
Financial Integration Financial integration is calculated as the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities divided 
by GDP, using the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database of Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2006). 
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FIGURE 3.1: Evolution of Finance and Property Rights over Time 
 
 
Notes: Starting in 1970, property rights data taken from the Fraser Institute are measured every five years, 
while financial development is measured as the average volume of credit allocated to the private sector 
over the five preceding years, i.e. from 1965-69, 1970-75, and so on. In each case, the chart plots the 
median value of property rights and financial development. 
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FIGURE 3.2 : Relationship between Finance and Property Rights (Property Rights are measured 
as the Average from 1970 to 2005 of the Fraser Institute’s Index) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The plot is of the smooth function in (5) along with the 95% confidence bands. Estimation was performed in 
R using the mgcv package Wood (2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
Chapter 4: Effects of collateral law reforms on access to finance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It is well established both in theory and empirics that collateral reduces incidences of 
credit rationing and facilitates efficient allocation of resources
9
.  These benefits are particularly 
large for developing countries where firms’ ability to put up collateral is limited (Liberti and 
Mian, 2010) and credit markets are plagued with informational frictions (Luoto et al. 2004).  A 
study conducted for World Bank, covering 60 low and middle-income countries in Europe, 
Central Asia and South Asia for the period 2001-2005, found that 70% percent of all rejected 
loan applications by firms are due to insufficient collaterals (Fleisig, 2006). The same study 
reported that nearly 31% of firms in South Asia and 20% in East Asia abstain from applying for 
a loan in anticipation that their application will not meet lenders’ collateral requirements.  
Naturally, the problem is more acute among the small firms due to their limited ability to provide 
collaterals (Beck et al 2008, Schiffer & Weder 2001, Fleisig 2002).   
In recent years, a number of policies have been put into motion in the low and the middle 
income countries with the objective of easing credit constraints facing firms in these countries.  
These reforms have drawn momentum from the facts that private firms in these countries own 
only 20% of assets in land and buildings which account for nearly 73% of accepted collateral 
(Fleisig et al. 2006).  This is in sharp contrast with the standard procedure followed by lenders in 
a developed financial market. For example, in the U.S., 50% of credit is secured by movable 
                                                          
9
 Please refer to Coco (2000) for a survey on theoretical literature emphasizing the role of collateral in reducing 
adverse selection and moral hazard problem in the credit market.  Also refer to Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009), 
Menkhoff et al., (2006), Hernandez-Cananovas and Martinez-Solano (2006), Chakraborty and Hu (2006), Brick and 
Palia (2007), Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) and Jiménez (2006) for supporting empirical evidence. 
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properties, and 99% of movable properties that are acceptable as collateral in the U.S. are 
unacceptable in Nigeria (Affaki 2010).   
The aforementioned legal reforms span across many countries and come in various forms 
including setting up of collateral registries, modernizing existing registries or taking initiatives to 
unify registries electronically across geographical regions. In other cases, the reforms were 
intended to reduce transaction costs by relaxing existing stringent collateral laws that require 
specific description of assets in the security arrangements.  In this essay, my focus is on a set of 
reforms that have allowed for a wider set of assets to be used as collateral. These assets include 
movable and intangible properties which prior to the reforms were excluded from the list of 
acceptable collaterals. In particular, I wish to examine the effects of such reforms on firms’ 
perceived access to finance in the twelve low and middle-income countries drawn from Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, Africa and South Asia that have undergone reforms with the goal of 
allowing intangible assets such as machinery, inventory, accounts receivables etc. to be used as 
collateral.  
For my analysis, I have drawn data from various sources.  For example, I have used the 
Enterprise Survey dataset published by World Bank to obtain firm-level data on perceived access 
to finance and other characteristics of firms in 88 low and middle countries over the period 2001-
2011. I have combined this information with the information on collateral law reforms drawn 
from the Doing Business Reports published by World Bank which offers details about changes in 
business regulations in 185 countries beginning 2004.   As additional controls I have used a 
number of institutional and financial variables which are known to have bearing on firms’ access 
to finance.   
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The analysis yields a number of policy relevant findings. First, I find that broadening the 
range of assets that can be used as collateral improves access to finance as perceived by firms.  
However, these effects are more pronounced in cases where reforms are accompanied or 
followed by movable collateral registries. This finding offers support to a recent study (Love et 
al. 2013) which suggests that setting up movable collateral registries generates positive and 
significant effects on bank loans, credit, over draft facility and interest rates. In addition, I find 
that the positive effects of collateral reforms on firms’ perceived access to finance increase in the 
firm size. This raises the possibility that the realized benefits of these reforms are misaligned 
with the main goal of helping smaller firms.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I layout the methodology 
underlying the analysis. Section 3 describes the data on reform and the variables that I use in the 
analysis. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes with some discussions. 
4.2 Methodology: 
The World Bank Enterprise Survey data is not longitudinal and does not track the same 
set of firms over the years.  This limits the possibility to rely on panel estimations.  As an 
alternative, I estimate the model using a two-way fixed effect linear regression model.
10
 This two 
way fixed effects model is a generalization of the difference in difference models which are a 
widely used identification strategy in applied econometrics. By using a group of non-reform 
countries as the treatment group, this model attempts to identify the effects of reforms in the 
control group of countries by controlling for cross sectional and time series variation. The use of 
                                                          
10
 In the existing literature, following the seminal article by Abowd et al. (1999), the two-way- fixed effect  models 
have  been used frequently in various contexts. For example, Abowd et al. (2009) and Woodcock (2008) have used 
this model to analyze employer-employee data. Whereas, Kramarz et al. (2008) and Bennett (2010) have used the 
methodology to analyze student-teacher data (and doctor-patient data, respectively. Also, please refer to  Mittag 
(2012) further  discussions on estimation procedure. 
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time series data for untreated (non-reform) countries, I am able to establish what would have 
happened in the absence of intervention (in this case the collateral law reforms). 
In particular, I consider the following specification: 
           (        )                                          
Where ‘i’ indexes firm, ‘j’ indexes country and ‘t’ indexes the years. Access to finance, which is 
our dependent variable, is denoted as       The set of firm-specific controls are denoted by       
    refers to country-level variables that are likely to influence firms’ access to finance. The year 
fixed effects and the country fixed effects are denoted by    and    respectively. These dummies 
control for the effect of any common time varying shock to the countries and the effects of time 
invariant country specific fixed effects.  
The idiosyncratic error is denoted as     . The usual assumption is that the latter is 
independent and identically distributed which is often violated. A natural generalization is to 
assume “clustered errors” i.e. that observations within group “i” are correlated in some unknown 
way, inducing correlation in      within i. In the present context, to account for the possibility 
that errors may be correlated across groups (countries), I have corrected the standard errors by 
using country-level clusters (Bertrand et al 2004). This allows me to account for grouped errors 
across individual firms. Possibility of errors to be correlated across time is less in this case due to 
the lack of substantial time variation in our data.  
 My primary variable of interest is “Reform,” which, for country  , takes the value equal 
to 1 for the reform year and the subsequent years following reform. The coefficient   is my main 
variable of interest which captures the effect of allowing movables and intangibles as collateral 
on the perceived access to finance after controlling for firm and country specific controls.  
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4.3 Data: 
4.3.1 Data on Reform years: 
I draw information about the dates and the details about country level reforms from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report. The Doing Business Report is a widely used study 
conducted by the World Bank on a yearly basis since 2004 that measures the costs to firms of 
doing business. As of 2012, these reports covers 185 countries and offer detail information about 
the costs, the requirements, and the procedures that a typical private firm encounters in these 
countries. The reports also include information on a range of regulatory changes pertaining to 
starting a business, obtaining construction permits, employing workers, registering property, 
getting credit, protecting investors, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a 
business etc. It also includes information on changes in regulations pertaining to the setting up of 
collateral reforms that are relevant for the present analysis. I use this information to isolate a list 
of twelve countries that have allowed for movable and intangibles (for instance, machinery, 
inventory, accounts receivables, etc.) to be used as mortgage during the last decade (2001-2011).  
The list includes seven Eastern European countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Ukraine, 
Estonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia), two Latin American countries (Peru, Guatemala), two 
Asian countries (Laos, Vietnam), and one African country (Rwanda). Table 4.1 provides 
information on reform details and reform dates for these countries. The nature of the collateral 
law reforms is different across these 12 countries. All the 12 countries expanded the range of 
options available in collateral thus allowing for creation of collateral not just in 
land/buildings/real estate but other movable assets, personal assets, intangibles (inventory and 
accounts receivables) etc. However Peru, Guatemala, Rwanda and Ukraine also opened collateral 
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registries in addition to the above mentioned reforms. These registries provide information on 
collateral registered as well on the existing relationship between borrowers and lenders.  
 
4.3.2 Data on Access to Finance: 
The World Bank’s Enterprise Survey dataset provides firm-level data on access to 
finance, which is the dependent variable in equation (1). The Enterprise Survey is a rich and 
comprehensive data set that provides firm-level data from over 70,000 establishments from 120 
countries. The data are collected through personal interviews with business owners, top 
managers, and accounting officials of manufacturing and service sectors firms.  Formal 
(registered) companies with 5 or more employees were considered for interview and.  Also, those 
firms with 100% government/state ownership were excluded from this process. I extract data 
from two waves of survey during the period 2002-2011. There is a wide variation in the size of 
the firms- 65% have less than 50 employees, 20% have 50 to 200 employees and the rest 15% 
have more than 200 employees.  
The Survey covers a wide range of topics related to the business environment, such as, 
general business characteristics, infrastructure, services, sales, supplies, access to finance, degree 
of competition, land, crime, business-government relations, investment climate constraints, 
labor, and productivity. The questions are mostly objective and are aimed at measuring the 
quality of the business environment. Less than 10% of the questions are subjective (asking the 
respondent for his or her opinion). The ‘access to finance’ variable is based on one of such 
subjective survey questions where firms were asked about their perception regarding the costs 
(e.g interest costs and fees) and the availability of external finance.   The goal of the question is 
to get an idea about the extent to which availability of external finance poses as an obstacle to the 
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operations and growth of the firms.  The responses were sought on a scale from zero to four 
where zero indicates no obstacles and four indicates the most severe obstacles faced by firms
11
. 
In Table 4.2 I present a brief description and the summary statistics on this variable along with 
other explanatory variables.  
 
4.3.3 Date on other control variables: 
 I also control for a number of financial, institutional and firm-specific information that 
are relevant for our analysis.  While the Enterprise survey data set remains as the source for the 
firm-level variables, I use the World Bank’s financial structure data base and World Governance 
Indicators for country-level institutional and financial variables. Here I provide details on some 
of these variables and the rest of the details are included in the Table 4.3.  
 The firm-level variable audit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a firm has its 
annual financial statement checked and certified by an external auditor and 0 otherwise. I include 
this control as more transparency is likely to have a positive effect on the access to external 
finance (Nguyen and Qian 2012).  In the Enterprise Survey, the managers were also asked 
whether or not they have confidence on the judicial system of the country when it comes to 
protecting their property rights. The responses were rated from 1 (Fully Disagree) to 6 (Fully 
agree). Since the strength of property rights are relevant for the financial development and the 
availability of credit (La Porta et al 2002, Besley & Ghatak 2009, Beck et al 2005), I include 
these responses as a control. Finally, the survey also includes a question on the ownership 
structure of firms. Since, a firm’s ownership structure could influence its access to credit 
                                                          
11
 During the first wave of survey, some countries (e.g., Ukraine, Estonia, Bosnia, Croatia and Romania) the 
responses were measured using scale ranging from 0 to 3.  Table 4.5 lists the particular years for which such scale 
was used. I explicitly consider the implication of this variation in the measurement during our analysis.   
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(Nguyen & Qian 2012, Love et al 2013), I include legal status as an additional control which 
takes the value 1 if the firm is privately held and zero otherwise.  
 I recognize that, in addition to firm level characteristics, country-wide factors such as 
institutional quality and the level of financial development could influence a firm’s access to 
finance.  Accordingly, I use the Index of Government Effectiveness from World Governance 
Indicator Project of the World Bank as a control to capture the quality of legal environment and 
the quality of institutions. This project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 
215 economies over the period 1996–2012, and measures the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to its 
stated policies. The project ranks Government Effectiveness of countries on a scale -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values indicating better governance.   
 To capture the level of financial development, I use three measures that are drawn from 
the World Bank’s Financial Structure Database and are widely used in the literature (Beck et al. 
2000). The first measure is the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial and 
central bank assets. This measure has been widely used as a proxy for financial development 
since the pioneering contributions by King and Levine (1993). The second measure is the ratio of 
liquid liabilities to GDP, which is considered as the broad indicator of financial deepening. 
Finally, I use the volume of credit supplied by the financial system to the private sector (as a 
ratio of GDP). In addition, I use the spread between the deposit rate and the lending rate of 
commercial banks as an indicator for financial development (Hasellman et al 2006, Nguyen and 
Qian 2012). A higher spread is usually associated with a tighter credit condition (Jimenesz et al 
2004).  Finally, I include growth rate of real per capita GDP as an additional control (Jimenesz et 
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al 2004, Love et al 2013, Hasellman et al 2006) to capture any potential effect coming from 
current macroeconomic condition to the credit market.  
 
4.4 Results: 
4.4.1 Access to Finance: 
I begin by regressing perceived access to finance against the reform dummy. As additional 
controls I include audit, legal status, judicial system, growth rate of GDP, interest rate spread and 
government effectiveness. At this stage I do not differentiate between the types of reforms (e.g. 
the reforms that have allowed intangible collateral versus reforms that have established collateral 
registries).  I report results in column 1 of the Table 4.4 with bank assets as a country-wide proxy 
for financial development.   
The findings suggest that some of the firm-specific characteristics matter for a firm’s access 
to finance.  For example, firms that are audited tend to have easier access to finance. Also, 
private firms have easier access to finance.  Similarly, higher growth, higher level of financial 
development (as measured by bank assets), and lower interest rate spread improve firms’ 
perception about access to finance.  There is also evidence that firms view external finance as a 
lesser obstacle when they give higher ratings to the quality of the judicial system and property 
rights institutions.  Such a relationship, however, is absent in the case of country-wide index 
measuring government effectiveness. I suspect that this is due to widely discussed weaknesses of 
the broad government effectiveness index in capturing true institutional qualities 
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(Kraan,Manning, Malinska 2006).
12
 The absence of the result could also be due to strong 
correlation between the country-wide index and the firm-level ‘Judicial System’ variable.   
Most Notably, after controlling for fixed effects, common time trend and a wide range of 
factors, the coefficient of the reform dummy is found to be -0.59 and significant at 1% level. 
This implies that reforms improve firms’ perception about access to finance. For further insight, I 
repeat the baseline regression by including a wider list of financial development indicators, one 
at a time, and report the relevant coefficients in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.4.  The coefficient 
reduces in magnitude to -.0.46 and -0.36. But they continue to be significant at 1% and 5% 
levels. Thus I find that in all these cases the association between the reform and the perceived 
access to finance remains positive and statistically significant. In the WBES data, there are some 
isolated cases where access to finance responses were measured by a 0 to 3 scale as opposed to a 
0-4 scale that applies in most cases.  As a robustness check, I re-run the regressions after 
dropping some countries and reform years for which this anomaly applies
13
. The coefficients of 
the reform dummy remains negative and significant. Further, as one might expect the size of the 
coefficients are now larger than the benchmark results.  
 
4.4.2 Effects of Firms’ Sizes: 
There is ample evidence to suggest that, in comparison to the larger and the medium size 
firms, the smaller firms face tighter credit constraints due to their limited ability to provide 
collaterals.  Therefore it is reasonable to form a hypothesis that the benefit of the reforms are 
unlikely to be uniform across firm sizes and is the smaller firms are likely to benefit most from 
                                                          
12
 Nguyen and Qian (2012) explored the determinants of collateralized borrowing using the same data set and 
similar set of institutional controls. According to them, effect of country level institutional indicators on intensive 
margin (collateral value) is muted and have very little effect on collateral value.  
13
 I dropped the reform countries Croatia and Romania entirely from the sample. I also removed years 2009 for 
Bosnia and Estonia, and year 2008 for Ukraine. 
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the reforms.  In this section, I test this hypothesis by running the baseline regression separately 
for small, medium and large firms.  I define small, medium and large firms if the number of 
permanent employees lies between 0-50, 50-200, and greater than 200, respectively.  The results 
are reported in column 1-3 of the Table 4.6.  In all the cases, the coefficients of the reform 
dummy remain significant and negative implying that the benefit of the reform accrues to firms 
of all sizes.  Interestingly, however, the magnitude of the coefficients increases with firm size
14
. 
The coefficients increase from -.479 in case of small firms to -0.9 for large firms. The same 
pattern emerges when I replace bank assets with other measures of financial development.  In 
fact, in the case of the private credit, the effects of reforms become insignificant for small firms.  
These results render support to other findings (e.g, Lilienfeld-total et al  2012) where smaller 
firms have experienced a contraction in credit and fixed assets, following a reform that 
strengthened banks’ ability to enforce credit contracts.  The results also raise a possibility that the 
effects of reforms may not be aligned with its objective of helping smaller firms. As in the 
previous section, I re-run the regressions after omitting cases where access to finance responses 
were measured in a 0-3 scale.  As shown in the Table 4.7, the same pattern prevails when I use 
private credit and liquid liabilities as measures of financial development. In the case of bank 
assets, the coefficient for medium firms is slightly higher than large firms, but both coefficients 
are significantly larger than the coefficient for the small firms. 
 
4.4.3 Effects of registry reforms: 
In practice, collateral reforms that broaden the range collaterals must meet other criteria to 
make an impact on firms’ access to finance. Among these, the most important one is the presence 
                                                          
14
 As an alternative, also considered an interaction term between the reform dummy and the log of firm size. In tis 
case the coefficient of interaction term appears insignificant. I suspect that this is due to the discontinuity in the 
relationship between firm size and the access to finance.   
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of an arrangement that notifies the parties about the existence of a security interest on an asset. 
Collateral registries serve this purpose by disseminating information about the existing lien on 
collaterals to potential lenders. It is already well-established that the presence of collateral 
registries mitigates information frictions and facilitates loan transactions.  For example, in a 
recent study covering 73 countries Love et al (2013)) found that setting up movable collateral 
registries have positive and significant effects on bank loans, credit, over draft facility and 
interest rates.   
In this section, I examine how the effects of collateral reforms vary in the presence and in the 
absence of movable collateral registries. For this purpose, I split the sample of reform countries 
into two groups. In the first group, broadening of the assets base were not accompanied or 
followed by collateral registries (e.g. in Estonia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, 
Vietnam). Whereas in the second group, the reforms were accompanied or immediately followed 
by establishment of collateral registries. (e.g., in Laos, Ukraine, Peru, Rwanda, Guatemala).  I 
estimate the baseline regression separately for these two groups and report the results in table 
3.8.  The findings are significantly different across the two groups.  
For example, the results in Columns 1 and 2 show that after controlling for banks assets, 
coefficient of reform dummy are negative and significant for those countries that did set up 
movable collateral registries. For those who did not, the coefficient on reform dummy is 
insignificant.   These results are robust to the changes in the measure of financial development 
(i.e., from bank asset to liquid liabilities and private credit).  As before I re-run the regression 
(Table 4.9) after making necessary adjustment in the data due to the variation in the response 
scale. Although the results become less striking compared to the full sample case, the 
coefficients of the reform dummy appear much larger for those with collateral registries when 
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bank assets and liquid liabilities are used as a proxy for financial development. In the case of 
private credit, the results are in tune with those presented in the Table 4.8.  
The above results are not surprising. While broadening the collateral base helps the 
borrowers, registries play a significant role in allowing lenders to more accurately evaluate risks, 
thus avoiding adverse selection. This reduces the information asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders, thus ensuring more accurate risk assessment and eventually expanding access to finance. 
While broadening the range of assets that can be used as collateral increases the capital available 
for borrowers, prevalence of registries expedites the financing process since lenders can now 
assess the credit worthiness of borrowers with greater objectivity. This finding is well-supported 
by other findings in the literature suggesting that the quality of information has bearing on the 
cost and availability of credit (Love and Mylenko 2005, Brown et al 2009). 
 
4.5 Conclusion: 
Using firm-level survey data, this chapter offers evidence that reforms whose objective is 
to enable the use of hitherto unused movable and intangible assets as collateral have a significant 
and positive effect on firms’ perception towards access to finance. However, such effect is more 
pronounced in countries where collateral reforms are accompanied by collateral registries for 
movable assets. In addition, the results suggest that the effects of reform vary with firm sizes 
with smaller firms benefiting the least. Thus the chapter provides evidence that the effects of 
reforms could be misaligned with its main goal of helping smaller firms.  
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TABLE 4.1:   LIST OF REFORM YEARS 
 
 
Country Asset Reform* Registry reform 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004   
Croatia 2006   
Estonia 2003   
Vietnam 2006   
Serbia 2004   
Montenegro 2004   
Romania 2009   
Peru 2006 2007 
Rwanda 2009 2009 
Guatemala 2008 2009 
Ukraine 2004 2004 
Laos 2005 2005 
 
*Asset reform refers to countries broadening the range of assets that can be allowed as collateral 
including movables and intangibles (Ex: Machinery, Inventory, Accounts receivables etc.). 
Source: Doing Business Reports, World Bank 2004-2012 
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TABLE 4.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Number of observations Mean Std. Dev 
Access to finance 129625 1.386716 1.384289 
Bank Assets 78014 0.881683 0.146082 
Liquid Liabilities 73011 0.46051 0.250821 
Private Credit 73191 0.368895 0.292412 
Interest rate spread 107212 -8.51739 7.963535 
Growth rate of GDP 137736 3.731377 4.337658 
Government Effectiveness Index 139677 -0.18135 0.659227 
Audit 137913 0.507653 0.503887 
Judicial System 112202 0.468601 0.499015 
Legal Status  117322 0.853156 1.281948 
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TABLE 4.3: DATA APPENDIX 
 
Country Specific Explanatory Variables 
 
 
 Growth  Rate:  Growth rate of real per capita GDP; Source: World development Indicator 
 
 Spread: Commercial Bank Deposit rate -Lending rate: Source: Financial Structure Data Base 
 
 Private credit: Private credit by deposit money banks and  other financial institutions as a percent of GDP; 
Source: Financial Structure Data Base 
 
 Bank assets: Ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central 
bank assets; Source: Financial Structure Data Base 
 
 Liquid liabilities: Liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP; Source: Financial Structure Data Base 
 
 Government effectiveness : Government effectiveness index:  captures  quality of public services, the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures; Source: World Governance 
Indicator Project 
 
 Firm Specific Explanatory Variables (Source: Enterprise Survey Data Base, World Bank) 
 
  
 Judicial System: Whether managers have confidence in judicial system of the country when it 
comes to protecting their property rights Index (1=Fully Disagree to 6 =Fully agree). 
  Legal status: Current legal status of firm Index  (1=Private firm, 0=Otherwise) 
 
 Audit: Does  establishment have its annual financial statement reviewed by an external auditor Index 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
  
Dependent Variable 
 
 Access to Finance: Is access to finance (interest cost, fees, collateral requirements) an obstacle for 
operation and growth?  [ Index: 0=No Obstacle, 1=Minor Obstacle, 2=Moderate Obstacle, 3=Major 
Obstacle, 4=Very    Severe Obstacle,  Source: Enterprise Survey Data Base, World Bank] 
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TABLE 4.4 (All reforms that broaden the range of collaterals) 
 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Reform -0.5905405*** -0.4597301*** -0.35707** 
  (0.2064688) (0.1571912) (0.153763) 
     
Growth Rate 0.0054799 -0.0619213 -0.05322 
  (0.0147491) (0.0381586) (0.033631) 
     
Spread 0.0495558** 0.0564563** 0.041197 
  (0.0228007) (0.0255032) (0.026877) 
     
Audit -0.1605669*** -0.1714065*** -0.17076*** 
  (0.0354899) (0.0328005) (0.032679) 
     
Judicial System -0.2137367*** -0.2134632*** -0.21352*** 
  0.0280231 0.0311452 0.031196 
     
Legal status -0.0221522* -0.0271717** -0.0286** 
  0.0124339 0.0129239 0.012992 
     
Govt Effectiveness 1.081896*** 0.8175117** 1.104215*** 
  0.2815831 0.3479874 0.321697 
     
Bank assets -3.042836***     
  1.007057     
  
 
    
Liquid liabilities   -3.414755**   
    1.324107   
    
 
  
Private credit     -1.69811* 
      0.855627 
      
 
R Square 
 
0.1146 
 
0.1216 0.1213 
N 
 
27021 
 
23916 23916 
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, 
*** respectively. Dependent variable in al regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 4. Coefficients of time, 
country dummy and constant terms are not reported.  
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TABLE 4.5 (Countries with access to finance rated from 0-3) 
 
Country 
Year of 
Reform 
 
Index of access to finance 
(Pre reform years) 
Index of access to finance 
(Post reform years) 
Estonia 2003 2002 (0-3) 2005 (0-3), 2009 (0-4) 
Bosnia 2004 2002 (0-3) 2005 (0-3), 2009 (0-4) 
Ukraine 2004 2002(0-3) 2005 (0-3), 2008 (0-4) 
Croatia 2006 2002, 2005 (0-3) 2007 (0-4) 
Romania 2009 2005 (0-3) 2009(0-4) 
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TABLE 4.6: All reforms that broaden the range of assets of collateral, allowing for firm size variation 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9 
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
Reform -0.479** -0.690* -0.905*** -0.354** -0.528** -0.764*** -0.259 -0.417* -0.537** 
  (0.203) (0.357) (0.265) (0.161) (0.243) (0.269) (0.168) (0.241) (0.233) 
           
Growth Rate 0.006 -0.001 0.023 -0.029 -0.103** -0.092** -0.020 -0.093** -0.077* 
  (0.013) (0.019) 0.016 (0.040) (0.045) (0.045) (0.036) (0.042) (0.039) 
           
Spread 0.038 0.065* 0.080** 0.041 0.064 0.072* 0.025 0.049 0.056 
  (0.023) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (0.040) (0.040) (0.027) (0.045) (0.047) 
           
Audit -0.134*** -0.047 -0.155** -0.129*** -0.070 -0.168** -0.128*** -0.069 -0.163** 
  (0.032) (0.058) (0.058) (0.032) (0.062) (0.064) (0.032) (0.061) (0.064) 
           
Judicial system -0.225*** -0.166*** -0.146** -0.227*** -0.158*** -0.137** -0.227*** -0.158*** -0.136** 
  (0.036) (0.041) (0.057) (0.039) (0.036) (0.054) (0.039) (0.036) (0.055) 
           
Legal Status -0.030* 0.000 0.019 -0.038** -0.018 0.028 -0.040** -0.018 0.026 
  (0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) 
           
Govt Effectiveness 1.006*** 0.664 1.855*** 0.578 0.755 2.192*** 0.842** 1.009* 2.422*** 
  (0.303) (0.420) (0.291) (0.358) (0.510) (0.582) (0.324) (0.499) (0.635) 
           
Bank Assets -2.666** -3.253** -4.076***   
 
    
 
  
  (1.130) (1.307) (0.952)   
 
    
 
  
       
 
    
 
  
Liquid Liabilities   
 
  -3.149* -3.272* -4.640***   
 
  
    
 
  (1.576) (1.825) (1.585)   
 
  
    
 
       
 
  
Private Credit   
 
    
 
  -1.978** -1.591 -1.101 
    
 
    
 
  (0.868) (1.214) (1.118) 
                 
R Square 0.1168 0.1372 0.1294 0.1176 0.1501 0.1469 0.1178 0.1498 0.1455  
N 17359 5679 3983 15606 5004 3306 15606 5004 3306  
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, 
*** respectively. Dependent variable in al regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 4. Small, medium and 
large refers to firm sizes. Their shares are approximately 60%, 30% and 10% .  Coefficients of time, country dummy 
and constant terms are not reported.  
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TABLE 4.7: All reforms that broaden the range of assets of collateral, allowing for firm size variation 
Results shown after adjustments made for countries where access to finance rated from 0-3 
 
  Column  1 Column 2 Column  3 Column  4 Column  5 Column  6 Column  7 Column  8 Column  9 
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
Reform -0.751*** -1.392*** -1.377*** -0.615** -1.132*** -1.215*** -0.561* -1.114*** -1.136** 
  (0.166) (0.412) (0.395) (0.257) (0.365) (0.496) 0.314  (0.375) (0.472) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Growth Rate 0.002 -0.006 0.014 -0.061 -0.161** -0.150** -0.034 -0.124** -0.090 
  (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.062) (0.067) (0.061) (0.054) (0.053) (0.058) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Spread 0.017 0.007 0.021 0.017 0.007 0.006 -0.003 -0.015 -0.030 
  (0.033) (0.025) (0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.064) (0.029) (0.037) (0.066) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Audit -0.140*** -0.047 -0.150** -0.137*** -0.071 -0.156** -0.137*** -0.072 -0.153** 
  (0.033) (0.061) (0.062) (0.033) (0.068) (0.072) (0.033) (0.067) (0.071) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Judicial System -0.222*** -0.164*** -0.131** -0.224*** -0.150*** -0.106** -0.224*** -0.150*** -0.104* 
  (0.038) (0.042) (0.058) (0.042) (0.034) (0.052) (0.042) (0.034) (0.052) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Legal Status -0.029* 0.004 0.025 -0.035** -0.009 0.041 -0.035** -0.010 0.040 
  (0.015) (0.024) (0.022) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Govt Effectiveness 0.992*** 0.509 1.646*** 0.661* 0.902* 2.363*** 0.879*** 1.076** 2.425*** 
  (0.322) (0.485) (0.394) (0.366) (0.491) (0.594) (0.298) (0.481) (0.613) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Bank Assets -2.562* -2.603* -3.453*** 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  (1.292) (1.452) (1.142) 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Liquid Liabilities 
 
 
  -3.100 -3.026* -4.845** 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  (2.024) (1.734) (1.915) 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Private Credit 
 
 
  
 
 
  -1.753* -0.946 -0.648 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  (1.006) (1.037) (1.165) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
R Square 0.119 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.159 0.143 0.121 0.159 0.152 
N 16641 5417 3796 14530 4614 3052 14530 4614 3052 
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, 
*** respectively. Coefficients of time, country dummy and constant terms are not reported.  
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TABLE 4.8: Comparison between countries with and without registry reforms 
Dependent variable in all regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 4. 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
  Registry No Registry Registry No Registry Registry No Registry 
Reform -1.157232*** -0.2059084 -1.320104*** -0.1036104 -1.506299*** 0.1184464 
  (0.22548)  (0.24898)  (0.22890)  (0.11406)  (0.26761)  (0.08352)  
Growth Rate 0.0026659 0.0061405 -0.0747666 -0.0505459 -0.027646 -0.0301768 
  (0.01103)  (0.01231)  (0.05583)  (0.03867)  (0.05469)  (0.03572)  
Spread -0.000722 0.0108528 -0.0043797 -0.0002926 -0.0389867** -0.0364339*** 
  (0.03085)  (0.02711)  (0.02625)  (0.01553)  (0.01695)  (0.01318)  
Audit -0.1653478*** -0.1669229*** -0.177713*** -0.1792511*** -0.1785355*** -0.1772756*** 
  (0.03734)  (0.03657)  (0.03432)  (0.03336)  (0.03426)  (0.03315)  
Judicial System -0.2104273*** -0.2165384*** -0.205844*** -0.2163867*** -0.2056638*** -0.215884*** 
  (0.02930)  (0.02961)  (0.03271)  (0.03284)  (0.03276)  (0.03296)  
Legal Status -0.01864 -0.01848 -0.019922 -0.0214351 -0.0202433 -0.0221177 
  (0.01322)  (0.01292)  (0.01442)  (0.01325  (0.01455)  (0.01329)  
Govt Effectiveness 0.8571447*** 0.783192*** 0.5137393 0.407715 0.6999543** 0.6938467*** 
  (0.30941)  (0.28610)  (0.33758)  (0.29398  (0.27505)  (0.21951)  
Bank Assets -2.346202* -2.136734*         
  (1.18520)  (1.08939)          
Liquid Liabilities 
 
  -4.190923** -4.560745***     
  
 
  (1.62785)  (1.14228)      
Private Credit 
 
      -2.657105*** -3.008883*** 
  
 
      (0.97171)  (0.76944)  
R Square 0.1145 0.1215 0.1237 0.1313 0.1238 0.1316 
N 25539 25069 21881 21964 21881 21964 
 
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, 
*** respectively. Dependent variable in al regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 4. Coefficients of time, 
country dummy and constant terms are not reported.  
All the countries have broadened the range of assets that can be used as collateral including movables and 
intangibles. Columns 1,3 and 5 include countries who have additionally opened up movable collateral registries, 
whereas columns 2, 4 and 6 include countries who have not .  
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TABLE 4.9: Comparison between countries with and without registry reforms 
Dependent variable in all regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 3. 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
  Registry No Registry Registry No Registry Registry No Registry 
Reform -1.157232*** -0.6153103*** -1.320104*** -0.3114887* -1.506299*** -0.0630453 
  (0.2255) (0.1396) (0.2289) (0.1761) (0.2676) (0.2515) 
Growth Rate 0.0026659 0.0012096 -0.0747666 -0.120302 -0.027646 -0.05413 
  (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0558) (0.0611) (0.0547) (0.0620) 
Spread -0.000722 -0.0026843 -0.0043797 -0.0009409 -0.0389867** -0.0406707** 
  (0.0309) (0.0317) (0.0263) (0.0276) (0.0170) (0.0179) 
Audit -0.1653478*** -0.1726278*** -0.177713*** -0.1870579*** -0.1785355*** -0.1878992*** 
  (0.0373) (0.0384) (0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0343) 
Judicial System -0.2104273*** -0.2129281*** -0.205844*** -0.2099667*** -0.2056638*** -0.2088898*** 
  (0.0293) (0.0308) (0.0327) (0.0344) (0.0328) (0.0346) 
Legal Status -0.01864 -0.0188878 -0.019922 -0.0199631 -0.0202433 -0.0201682 
  (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0148) 
Govt Effectiveness 0.8571447*** 0.8373018*** 0.5137393 0.6094859* 0.6999543** 0.8037627*** 
  (0.3094) (0.2954) (0.3376) (0.3356) (0.2751) (0.2600) 
Bank Assets -2.346202* -2.221588*         
  (1.1852) (1.1597)         
Liquid Liabilities     -4.190923** -4.984427***     
      (1.6279) (1.6939)     
Private Credit         -2.657105*** -2.768359** 
          (0.9717) (1.0856) 
R Square 0.1145 0.1239 0.1237 0.1362 0.1238 0.1359 
N 25539 23902 21881 20244 21881 20244 
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